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CHAPTER 6 
Labor Law 
DAVID F. GRUNEBAUM* 
§6.1. Introduction. The material contained in this chapter repre-
sents a brief outline and analysis of the significant decisions of the 
Massachusetts appellate courts and the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission during the Survey year. The chapter deals only with cases 
in the area of labor management relations and does not touch on de-
cisions relating to such matters as workmen's compensation, pension 
reform, and environmental and industrial safety. Moreover, the chap-
ter does not represent the courts' entire output during the Survey 
year, nor that of the Commission in the area of labor management re-
lations. The decisions surveyed do represent, however, the most 
noteworthy contributions made by the courts and the Commission in 
areas where the law is just beginning to emerge. In this context, it 
should be noted that federal labor law as administered under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act by the· National Labor Relations Board has, 
with only minor substantive changes, operated under the same statu-
tory provisions since 1947,1 whereas Massachusetts labor law, the most 
significant aspect of which involves the public sector, has operated 
under the present law only since July 1974.2 Accordingly, the signifi-
cance of many of the decisions discussed in the chapter lies in their 
role in defining the terms of the new public employee collective bar-
gaining law and clarifying the relationship of this law to existing laws 
in the Commonwealth. 
§6.2. Appropriate Bargaining Representative. During the Survey 
year in Labor Relations Commission v. Natick,l the Supreme Judicial 
Court dealt with the issue of who was the appropriate bargaining rep-
resentative for the municipal employer in negotiations with 
§DAVID F. GRUNEBAU\I is Counsel for the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, 
Boston. 
This article was written by the author in his private capacity. No official support or 
endorsement by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission is intended or should 
be inferred. 
§6.1. 1 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970). 
2 G.L. c. 150E, as enacted by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 2. 
§6.2.1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 31, 339 N.E.2d 900. 
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I 
policemen-the selectmen of the municipality or ithe police chief.2 
The Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission had adopted a pro-
cedure that bifurcated the obligations and gave the Iselectmen and the 
chief each a portion of the responsibility.3 The Commission's position 
appeared reasonable in light of the Supreme judicidl Court's decisions 
in Chief of Police of Dracut v. Dracut4 and Chief of Piolice of Wesiford v. 
Wesiford. 5 The Dracut and Wesiford decisions established the distinction 
between so-called strong and weak police chiefs as that distinction re-
lated to the statutory distribution of administrative Jpower and collec-
tive bargaining authority between police chiefs and municipal select-
men. ! 
The suit in Dracut was instituted by the police chief of Dracut who 
sought a declaration that certain provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement negotiated between the board of se~ectmen of Dracut 
and the police officer's association infringed upon tqe chiefs exclusive 
authority to make administrative regulations und~r section 97 A of 
chapter 41 of the General Laws-the "strong chie(" law-and were 
therefore null and void.6 Section 97A, in general, grants to the police 
chief of any town adopting the section the right to "make suitable 
regulations governing the police department" and t;e authority to as-
sert "immediate control ... of the police officers, whom he shall as-
sign to their respective duties and who shall obey ~is orders."7 The 
board of selectmen, however, pursuant to then applicable municipal 
I 
2 Natick was a consolidation of four separate cases. See id. at 31, 31 n.l, 339 N.E.2d at 
901,901 n.!. I 
"See id. at 41,339 N.E.2d at 905. 
4357 Mass. 492, 258 N.E.2d 531 (1970). For a further discussikln of Town of Dracut, 
see Sikora, State and Local Government, 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 24.6, at 584. 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039, 313 N.E.2d 443. For a further \:Iiscussion of Town rf 
Westford, see Armstrong, State and Local Government, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 17.3, 
at 413. I 
6 See 357 Mass. at 493-94,504,258 N.E.2d .at 532, 539. C.L. c. 41, § 97A, provides: 
In any town which accepts this section there shall be a police! department estab-
lished by the selectmen, and such department shall be under the supervision of an 
officer to be known as the chief of police. The selectmen of ~ny such town shall 
appoint a chief of police and such other officers as they deem necessary, and fix 
their compensation, not exceeding, in the aggregate, the anhual appropriation 
therefor. In any such town in which such appointments are no~ subject to chapter 
thirty-one, they shall be made annually and the selectmen mayl remove such chief 
or other officers for cause at any time after a hearing. The chief of police in any 
such town shall from time to time make suitable regulations governing the police 
department, and the officers thereof, subject to the approval of the selectmen; 
provided, that such regulations shall become effective without shch approval upon 
the failure of the selectmen to take action thereon within thi~ty days after they 
have been submitted to them by the chief of police. The chief 06 police in any such 
town shall be in immediate control of all town property used qy the department, 
and of the police officers, whom he shall assign to their respective duties and who 
shall obey his orders. Section ninety-seven shall not apply in ary town which ac-
cepts the provisions of this section. Acceptance of the provisions of this section 
shall be by a vote at an annual town meeting. 
7 [d. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/10
§6.2 LABOR LAW 159 
collective bargaining laws,8 had sole power as "chief executive 
officer[sl" to conduct collective bargaining negotiations with municipal 
employees with regard to "wages, hours and other conditions of 
employment."9 Thus, at issue in Dracut, was the question of whether 
section 97 A should be harmonized with or preempted by the munici-
pal collective bargaining law in regards to the proper subjects for col-
lective bargaining. 
The Supreme Judicial Court chose to accommodate section 97A 
with the collective bargaining statute. In this context, the Court de-
termined that the selectmen's bargaining authority must be exercised 
in light of and in deference to the police chiefs section 97 A powers. 
Accordingly, the Court stated: 
All the statutes must be construed, where capable, so as to consti-
tute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose 
disclosed in the new act [G.L. c. 149, §§ 178G-178Nl .... 
The several statutes involved in this case do not compel a con-
clusion that the total authority over the town's police department 
is vested in either the chief or in the board of selectmen. They 
give a measure of authority to each. 10 
Therefore, the Court held that the selectmen had exceeded their au-
thority in negotiating a contract with the police officers, which con-
tract included provisions dealing with shifts, duties, vacations, and 
leaves of absences. 11 
The suit in Westford was similarly instituted by the town's police 
chief, who challenged the selectmen's authority to negotiate an 
8 G.L. c. 149, §§ 178G-178N, repealed by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § I, and replaced by Acts 
of 1973, c. 1078, § 2 (codified at G.L. c. 150E). 
9 G.L. c. 149, § 1781, as amended by Acts of 1969, c. 341, and later repealed by Acts of 
1973, c. 1078, § 1. In pertinent part, § 1781 provided: 
For the purposes of collective bargaining, the representative of the municipal 
employer and the representative of the employees shall meet at reasonable times, 
including meetings appropriately related to the budget making process, and shall 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employ-
ment .... In the event that any part or provision of any such agreement is in con-
flict with any law, ordinance or by-law, such law, ordinance or by-law shall prevail 
so long as such conflict remains. 
After the trial in Dracut, but prior to the case reaching the Court, § 1781 was amended 
by Acts of 1969, c. 341, to include the following addition: "provided, however, that the 
provisions of any such agreement shall prevail over any regulation made by a chief of 
police pursuant to section ninety-seven A of chapter forty-one." The Court in Dracut 
asserted, however, that the amendment did not affect the disposition of that case. In 
this context, the Court stated: 
This amendment does not affect this case because the record does not show that 
there are any regulations made by the chief of police pursuant to § 97 A now in ef-
fect. It does not appear whether the chief has even made any such regulations, nor 
does it appear whether regulations, if any, made by him have been disapproved by 
the selectmen. 
357 Mass. at 499 n.3, 258 N.E.2d at 535 n.3. 
10 357 Mass. at 499, 258 N.E.2d at 535-36. 
llId. at 500-02, 258 N.E.2d at 536-37. 
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agreement dealing with matters of scheduling and assignment. 12 In 
Westford, however, the chiefs statutory authority was grounded in sec-
tion 97 of chapter 41 of the General Laws-the "weak chief" law-
-rather than section 97 A. In contrast to section 97 A, section 97 pro-
vides that the police department is to be established "under the di-
rection of the selectmen" and that only the selectmen have the power 
to make "suitable regulations." Focusing on this distinction,13 the 
Court in Westford concluded that the selectmen had not improperly 
included in their negotiations with the police association matters relat-
ing to scheduling and assignments. 14 
In Natick, the Commission, relying on the strong chief/weak chief 
distinction developed in Dracut and Westford, asserted that the collec-
tive bargaining responsibilities of the employer-municipality should be 
divided between the chief of police and the selectmen since the town 
had adopted section 97 A of chapter 4l. 15 Accordingly, in its decision 
and order the Commission ruled that Natick, by adopting section 
97 A, had designated the chief of police as one of the municipal em-
ployers for the purposes of collective bargaining. In addition, the 
Commission ruled that either the police chiefs refusal to bargain or 
the selectmen's failure to appoint the chief as a co-bargaining rep-
resentative would constitute a failure to bargain in good faith. 16 
On review, the Supreme Judicial Court, prior to reaching the rep-
resentative question, laid to rest the strong chief/weak chief distinction 
as developed in Dracut and Wesiford and as applied to the question of 
distinguishing what matters were proper subjects for collective 
bargaining. 17 The Court first cited the language of section 7 of chap-
ter 150E of the General Laws: 18 
If a collective bargaining agreement reached by the employer and 
the exclusive representative contains a conflict between matters 
which are within the scope of negotiations pursuant to section six 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1041,313 N.E.2d at 445. 
13Id. at 1043-45,313 N.E.2d at 446-47. 
14 Id. at 1045, 313 N.E.2d at 447. 
15 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 35, 40-44, 339 N.E.2d at 903, 905-06. In addition to the 
question of the proper bargaining representatives for the negotiations with the police 
association. the Court in Natick was asked to make a similar determination with regard 
to the proper representatives for the negotiations with the firefighters association. Id. 
at 32, 339 N.E.2d at 902. The Court, noting that the town had adopted the strong fire 
chief statute, G.L. c. 48, § 42, and further noting that § 42 was comparable to § 97 A, 
approached the two issues as involving the same questions for the purposes of their de-
cision. See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 37-41, 339 N.E.2d at 904-05. Accordingly, the discus-
sion of Natick contained in this section will focus only on the police chief issue. 
16 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 35,339 N.E.2d at 903. 
17Id. at 39-40, 339 N.E.2d at 904. 
18 Although the Natick case arose initially under the old collective bargaining law, G.L. 
c. 149 §§ 178G-178N, see 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 35,339 N.E.2d at 903, the Court ap-
plied the Commonwealth's new collective bargaining law, G.L. c. 150E, since the 
Commission's order was applicable to future conduct. 
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of this chapter and the regulations of a police chief ... pur-
suant to ... [G.L. c. 41, § 97 A ... ] ... , the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement shall prevail. 19 
The Court then concluded that "[i]f rules and regulations of the respec-
tive chiefs may be overridden in the bargaining process, plainly there is a 
right to bargain on topics covered by those regulations which involve 
'terms and conditions of employment' (G.L. c. 150E, § 6)."20 
After addressing the issue of the proper subjects for collective bar-
gaining, the Court turned to the question of who was the proper 
municipal bargaining representative. The Court rejected the Com-
mission's finding of dual municipal bargaining representatives on 
the ground that chapter 150E contained "no explicit recognition that 
there may be more than one locus of a municipality's bargaining 
authority."21 In rejecting the Commission's position, the Court first 
noted that section 6 of chapter 150E requires that the "employer" 
meet with its employees' exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective bargaining.22 The Court then noted that section 1 of chap-
ter 150E defines a municipal employer for the purpose of collective 
bargaining as a city or town "acting through its chief executive officer, 
and any individual who is designated to represent [the town] and act 
in its interest in dealing with public employees."23 Noting that chapter 
150E speaks only of a single chief executive officer, the Court rejected 
the Commission's suggestion that "Natick has multiple 'chief executive 
officers' .... "24 The Court also focused on the impact of section 7 of 
chapter 150E, concluding: 
We believe that, by enacting G.L. c. 150E, § 7, the Legislature in-
tended to change the result in circumstances similar to those exist-
ing in the Dracut case, not just providing that "strong" chief regu-
lations may be overridden in the bargaining process but also pro-
viding that the selectmen may negotiate conclusively on subjects 
otherwise assigned to the respective chiefs. 25 
In addition to its analysis of the applicable statutory provisions, the 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 39, 339 N.E.2d at 904. 
20 [d. at 39-40, 339 N.E.2d at 904. Although not denoted as such, this holding by the 
Court apparently overrules its holding in Dracut. Prior to the Court's Dracut decision, 
the General Court amended G.L. c. 149, § 1781, to specifically provide that the terms of 
a collective bargaining agreement would prevail over conflicting regulations adopted by 
a police chief pursuant to § 97 A, Acts of 1969, c.341. Thus, the Court in Dracut had be-
fore it substantially the same statutory language relating to the regulations of police 
chiefs as it had in Natick, yet in Dracut the Court did not find a right to bargain over 
subjects covered by the regulations of the police chief. See 357 Mass. at 499, 258 N.E.2d 
at 535-36. 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 41,339 N.E.2d at 905. 
22/d. at 40,339 N.E.2d at 905. 
23/d. 
24 [d. 
25 [d. at 45, 339 N.E.2d at 906-07. 
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Court also focused on the implications of dual representation on the 
fundamental labor policy of promoting industria~ peace. The Court 
concluded that a bifurcated system of representadon and negotiation 
would more likely result in labor conflict than wotj.ld a system of uni-
lateral authority.26 Accordingly, in light of this policy consideration 
and the statutory analysis undertaken by the Court, the Natick Court 
refused to enforce the Commission's order requiri~g the selectmen of 
Natick to appoint, as co-representative for the purposes of collective 
bargaining, the chief of police.27 . 
The Natick decision serves to establish a clear dividing line between 
the administrative power of police chiefs and the collective bargaining 
authority of municipal selectmen. Thus, while thtf strong chief/weak 
chief distinction will continue to be viable as it rel<+tes to the adminis-
trative responsibilities of chiefs of police, the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Natick has emphatically stated that the admini~trative power of a 
so-called strong chief will not affect the autonomy of the selectmen in 
their capacity as municipal collective bargaining Irepresentatives. In 
addition, the Natick decision indicates a willingness I on the part of the 
Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission, not sim-
ply with respect to issues of law, but also with resp~ct to more funda-
mental labor policy issues.28 
§ 6.3. Commission Dispute Settlement AuthoJity Under Section 
9A of Chapter 150E. In Director of the Division of J+mployee Relations v. 
Labor Relations Commission,! the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
Labor Relations Commission had exceeded its authority when it or-
dered the Department of Public Welfare and the scrcial workers union 
to enter into binding arbitration as a condition to the grant by the 
Commission of a cease and desist order to the emplbyer.2 
In Director OER, the state social workers union ~ad sought to pro-
test a hiring freeze, which freeze had the effect of increasing their 
workload beyond the level agreed upon under thel collective bargain-
ing contract. The union, however, did not seek gt;ievance arbitration 
! 
26Id. at 41,339 N.E.2d at 905. On this point the Court noted Jhat: 
Id. 
The bifurcated negotiations contemplated by the commissio~ do not present an 
obvious, desirable format for collective bargaining. Even assuming that the areas of 
respective responsibility can be assigned easily between the selF.ctmen and the par-
ticular chief, there remains the fact that bargaining often involves "give and take" 
on various matters in negotiation. The selectmen and a ch~ef may disagree on 
which of them should make concessions in order to come to an agreement, and, if 
they do disagree, the negotiation process is complicated. :t-foreover, chiefs as 
negotiators might have a conflict of interest because their own salaries may be af-
fected by the salaries negotiated in the bargaining process. I 
27Id. at 46, 339 N .E.2d at 907. I 
28 See G.L. c. 30A, § 14. State Administrative Procedure; Judicial Review. 
i §6.3. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1045,346 N.E.2d 852. 
2/d. at 1061, 346 N.E.2d at 860. 
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pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement, but instead filed a 
prohibited practice charge with the Commission under section 10(a)(5) 
of chapter 150£3 while at the same time refusing to handle in excess 
of 120 cases per worker.4 The state alleged that such a refusal by the 
union constituted an illegal work stoppage or slowdown. The state 
immediately petitioned the Commission for an injunction and cease 
and desist order. The Commission issued the cease and desist order 
along with an accompanying order to commence binding arbitration.s 
Both sides objected to the Commission's order. In an appeal brought 
by the employer, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the cease and 
desist order, but held that section 9A(b) of chapter 150£ of the Gen-
eral Laws, which section empowers the Commission to enforce the 
section 9A(a) ban on strikes and slowdowns,6 and includes language 
permitting the Commission to "set requirements," is not so broad as to 
permit the ordering of binding arbitration. 7 Subsection (b) of section 
9A provides: 
Whenever a strike occurs or is about to occur, the employer shall 
petition the commission to make an investigation. If, after inves-
tigation, the commission determines that any provision of para-
graph (a) of this section has been or is about to be violated, it shall 
immediately set requirements that must be complied with, includ-
ing, but not limited to, instituting appropriate proceedings in the 
superior court for the county wherein such violation has occurred 
or is about to occur for enforcement of such requirements. 8 
The Commission had argued before the Supreme Judicial Court 
that the "setting of requirements" language of section 9A(b) au-
thorized the Commission not only to compel compliance with the sec-
tion 9A(a) prohibitions, but also to compel the employer and union to 
undertake activities, such as arbitration, designed to resolve the 
3 C.L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(5), provides in part: "(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a 
public employer or its designated representative to: ... (5) Refuse to bargain collec-
tively in good faith with the exclusive representative as required in section six .... " 
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at lO46-47, 346 N.E.2d at 854. 
5Id. at lO48-49, 346 N.E.2d at 854-55. The Commission's order provided in part: 
1. That Local 509, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO cease and 
desist from encouraging or sanctioning the withholding of services by social work-
ers employed at the Department of Public Welfare; 2. That the Employer and 
the Union promptly submit to binding arbitration, pursuant to Article XII of the 
parties' agreement, the disputed assignment of surplus cases and imposition of an 
alleged hiring freeze; 3. That the Employer and the Union participate in good 
faith in the arbitration procedures, as required by Chapter 150E, Section lO(a)(6) 
"Id. at lO48 nA, 346 N.E.2d at 855 nA. C.L. c. 150E, § 9A(a), provides: "No public 
employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no public employee or 
employee organization shall induce, encourage or condone any strike, work stoppage, 
slowdown or withholding of services by such public employees." 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at lO50, 346 N.E.2d at 855. 
8 C.L. c. 150E, § 9A(b). 
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underlying dispute.9 The Court, however, inter reted the "set re-
quirements" language of the statute to mean that hile such language 
did empower the Commission to place quantifiabl standards of pro-
ductivity upon employees, so that possible viola ions of the order 
could be more easily established, the language di not authorize the 
imposition by the Commission of extrinsic conditio s, such as arbitra-
tion orders.lO 
In arriving at its conclusion with respect to he extent of the 
Commission's authority under the "set requireme ts" language, the 
Court examined the legislative history of section 9A(b). The Court 
noted that the broader scope of the language origi ated in early ver-
sions of the statute governing labor relations in th public sector that 
would have permitted a limited right to strikeY U der those circum-
stances, the Court reasoned, the language' would ave permitted the 
Commission to impose restrictions necessary for public health and 
safety.12 As the bill was finally enacted, however, it ontained an abso-
lute prohibition on employee work stoppages. 13 T erefore, the Court 
determined that in light of such a prohibition, the eed for the addi-
tional language designed to maintain vital s rvices had been 
obviated. 14 The Court, however, asserted that the 'set requirements" 
language retained its evident meaning, noting that he provision could 
be used in a case such as the one at issue to set inimum levels of 
performance for determining whether the slowdow was continuing. Iii 
Thus, the Court read the "set requirements" Ian uage as providing 
assistance in the enforcement of a cease and desi t order in a work 
slowdown situation, rather than as offering an a ditional, indepen-
dent tool for promoting the entire collective bargai ing process. 
The Director OER Court also rejected the Com ission's argument 
that the right to set conditions would assist it in esolving disputes. 
The Court noted that the Commission's immediate deferral to an ar-
bitrator had removed the dispute from the Com ission's settlement 
process almost as quickly as the dispute had ent red the process.16 
From the Court's point of view, such a deferral t an arbitrator ne-
gated the Commission's argument, since the Com ission had taken 
no steps other than the appointment of an entirel separate party to 
resolve the dispute. 17 In addition, the Court strong y emphasized the 
power of a section 9A(b) injunction and the i portance of the 
Commission's neutrality, implying that in some man er, a conditioned 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1051-52,346 N.E.2d at 856. 
I°Id. 
11 H. Doc. No. 6194, app. B. (1973). 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1052-54,346 N.E.2d at 856-57. 
13 See G.L. c. 150E, § 9A(a). 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1055-56,346 N.E.2d at 857. 
15 /d. at 1056, 346 N.E.2d at 858. 
18Id. at 1057, 346 N.E.2d at 858. 
17 /d. 
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order might detract from the Commission's neutrality. In this context, 
the Court stated: 
[T]here is an underestimation of the value of § 9A(b) which looks 
to the intervention in a strike situation of an impartial agency with 
specialized experience. It can be hoped that a byproduct effect of 
this intervention will often be a reconciliation of the parties and 
an end to the difficulty. Even where resort by the Commission to 
a court becomes necessary, the fact that it is an independent body 
that seeks the order, instead of the employer as before the enact-
ment of c. 150E ... is likely to make the result more acceptable to 
the employees. I8 
The Commission further argued that the public employee collective 
bargaining statute encourages arbitration. The Court, however, as-
serted that chapter 150E "expresses no unrestrained preference for 
arbitration in the public employment situations,"19 and emphasized 
that under section 8 of chapter 150E the Commission can only order 
grievance arbitration at the request of one of the parties, and under 
section 9 of chapter 150E, impasse arbitration must be voluntarily 
instituted.20 
In addition to the Commission's arguments, the union sought to 
make a Boys Market2I argument to the effect that an anti-strike injunc-
tion carried with it a correlative duty to arbitrate.22 The Court re-
jected this position, noting correctly that no right to strike had pre-
ceded the obligation to arbitrate and that unlike the private sector, no 
absolute right to strike existed in the public sector.23 Rather, in the 
public sector, there is and has been an historic prohibition on strikes 
that in fact preceded any right on the part of public employees to en-
gage in collective bargaining. It should be added that the dispute was 
not actually over the issue of arbitration per se, but more accurately 
over what issues should be presented to the arbitrator.24 
The overall effect of the Director OER decision was substantially to 
limit the role of the Commission in attempting to resolve disputes 
under the authority of section 9A. The decision tends to reduce the 
Commission's role to a relatively ministerial one. Nevertheless, the 
18 [d (citations omitted). 
19 [d. at 1058,346 N.E.2d at 858. 
20 [d. 
21 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Boys Markets, 
the Supreme Court had held that despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a federal court 
could enjoin a strike if that strike was over an arbitrable dispute, id. at 254, but only if 
the employer agreed to arbitrate that dispute. [d. See generally Axelrod, The Application rif 
the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C. IND. Be COM. L. REV. 893 (1975). 
221976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1059-60,346 N.E.2d at 859. 
23 [d. at 1059-61, 346 N.E.2d at 859-60 . 
•• [d. at 1049-50, 346 N.E.2d at 855. The employer was wiIling to arbitrate the issue 
of whether an assignment of over 120 cases was permissible. The employer objected, 
however, to arbitration over the legality of the hiring freeze, arguing that this was a 
management prerogative and necessitated by fiscal exigency. [d. 
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Court left open the issue of whether the commisston might impose 
conditions upon the parties other than binding ar itration. On this 
point, it should be noted that one of the Court's criticisms of the 
Commission's argument that the right to set conditi ns would assist it 
in resolving disputes was that the Commission's condition in the in-
stant case only transferred the responsibility of settling the dispute to 
a different party. This criticism might not be apposite if in a different 
case the conditions imposed did not include compulsory arbitration. 
Also unanswered was the issue of the timing and the actual duty of 
the Commission to find the existence or pendin~ likelihood of a 
strike. Presumably, the Commission's investigative eriod might still 
be used to extract productive movement on the pa t of the parties in 
resolving the underlying dispute. ~ 
§6.4. Authority of an Arbitrator: Managerial P erogatives Under 
Chapter 150E. The Supreme Judicial Court iss ed two decisions 
during the Survey year involving a school committee's right to unilat-
erally abolish existing administrative positions. At issue in these deci-
sions was the inte~relationship of the school committee's managerial 
rights as defined generally by section 37 of chapter 71 of the General 
Laws and the rights of public employees under the applicable munici-
pal employees collective bargaining statute. 1 
In School Committee of Hanover v. Curry,2 the sch 01 committee and 
the teachers' association were parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment which was effective through August 31, 197 , and which pro-
vided for grievance and arbitration procedures t r disputes arising 
during the term of the agreement.3 Prior to the expiration of this 
agreement, the school committee voted to abolis the position of 
supervisor of music, effective after the expiration of the agreement.4 
After the committee made its decision, the union submitted the issue 
to grievance arbitration. The arbitrator, eight months after the 
supervisor's position was eliminated, ordered the committee to rein-
state the employee to his supervisory position with back pay. The 
arbitrator's order, however, was vacated by the supe ior court.5 
In an appeal by the union to the Appeals Court, he school commit-
tee contended that the arbitrator's award was pro erly vacated since 
that award compelled the committee to violate sec ion 37 of chapter 
§ 6.4. 1 In School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 
144, the applicable public employee collective bargaining statute was G.L. c. 149, §§ 
178G-178N. See School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 467, 
471-72, 325 N.E.2d 282, 284-85. In School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145, the dispute at issue arose after the effective date 
of G.L. c. 150E. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 400,343 N.E.2d at 146-47. 
2 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144. The facts of thr Hanover case are set 
forth in the Appeals Court decision. 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Ad . Sh. 467, 325 N.E.2d 
~82. 
3 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 468,325 N.E.2d at 283. I 
• Id. at 468-69, 325 N.E.2d at 284. I 
5Id. at 469-70,325 N.E.2d at 284. I 
I 
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71 of the General Laws insofar as the award forced the committee to 
delegate to the arbitrator nondelegable matters relating to educational 
policy.6 In approaching the issue, the Appeals Court sought to har-
monize the general managerial mandate of section 37 with the later 
enacted provisions of sections 178H(lV and 178J8 of chapter 149, 
which sections conferred on public employees the right to bargain col-
lectively as well as provided for the arbitration of disputes over the re-
sulting contract terms.9 The Appeals Court, emphasizing the public 
responsibility of the school committee, concluded that the abolition of 
the supervisory position was a matter "predominantly within the 
realm of educational poJicy,"lO and accordingly was an exclusive man-
agerial prerogative that the committee "[could not] bargain away, as it 
could if it were a private party not subject to public control."ll 
Emphasizing that its decision in Hanover must be read in conjunc-
tion with its holding in another case decided the same day as Hanover, 
School Committee of Braintree v. Raymond,12 the Supreme Judicial Court 
adopted the Appeals Court's reasoning in Hanover and affirmed the 
lower court's decision.13 The facts of Braintree and Hanover were sub-
stantially the same, except that the grievance in Braintree arose after 
the effective date of chapter 150E and one year prior to the expira-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement. 14 As in Hanover, the arbi-
6Id. at 470, 325 N.E.2d at 284. G.L. c. 71, § 37, provides in part that the school 
committee "shall have general charge of all the public schools .... " The school commit-
tee also asserted that the arbitrator's award required them to violate G.L. c. 71, § 43. 
The Appeals Court, however, did not reach that issue. 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
471 n.6, 325 N.E.2d at 284 n.6. In addition, the committee argued that the arbitrator 
exceeded his powers "in reinstating the employee with back pay as of September 1, 
1973, since the collective bargaining agreement under which the grievance arose had 
expired on August 31, 1973" and that "certain findings of the arbitrator were plainly 
erroneous." Id. at 470-71,325 N.E.2d at 284. The court, however, did not reach these 
contentions.ld. at 471,325 N.E.2d at 284. 
7 G.L. c. 149, § 178H(l), provides in part that "[eJmployees shall have ... the right 
... to bargain ,;ollectively ... on questions of wages, hours and other conditions of em-
ployment .... 
8 The Appeals Court apparently mistakenly referred to § 178J instead of § 178K. Sec-
tion 178K provides in part: "The services of the state board of conciliation and arbitra-
tion shall also be available to municipal employers and employee organizations for pur-
poses of ... arbitration of disputes over the interpretation or application of the terms 
of the written agreement." G.L. c. 149, § 178K. Section 178J on the other hand sets out 
the factfinding process which is to be used by municipal employers and employee or-
ganizations.!d. § 178J. 
9See 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 471-78,325 N.E.2d at 284-87. 
10Id. at 477,325 N.E.2d at 286. 
11 Id. at 480,325 N.E.2d at 287. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 397-98, 343 N.E.2d at 145. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 401,343 N.E.2d at 147. 
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trator in Braintree had ordered the complaining party reinstated with 
back pay.15 
Analyzing the significance of the enactment of chapter 150E on the 
dispute in Braintree, the Court interpreted section 5 of chapter 1078 
of the Acts of 1973 as indicating that chapter 150E was not to govern 
agreements enacted prior to the effective date of chapter 150E.16 Sig-
nificantly, the Court in Braintree also concluded that, even if chapter 
150E was applicable, the difference between that statute and chapter 
149 would not be material to the controversy at hand. 17 The Court, 
however, viewed as material the fact that the grievance occurred one 
year prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. IS 
With respect to the reinstatement issue, the Court concluded that 
the school committee could not bind itself not to abolish a supervisory 
position for a period extending beyond the end of the school year re-
gardless of the terms of the agreement. 19 The Court's conclusion fol-
lowed from its position that employment contracts for supervisors are 
invalid if encompassing more than one school year at a time.20 How-
ever, with respect to the loss of compensation question, the Court, in 
affirming the arbitrator's back pay award, concluded that the school 
committee could provide in the collective bargaining agreement for 
the payment of lost compensation to an employee whose position was 
eliminated pursuant to the committee's managerial prerogative.21 Fi-
nally, and significantly, the Court cautioned that it was not deciding 
any question relating to the issue of mandatory versus permissive sub-
jects of bargaining. In this context, the Court noted that "[a] marked 
distinction exists between a duty to engage in collective bargaining, 
and a freedom to agree to submit controversies, whether or not sub-
ject to mandatory bargaining, to arbitration."22 
Hanover and Braintree represent an effort by the Court to begin to 
define the parameters of exclusive management prerogatives in the 
public sector. The Court has established that the authority to abolish a 
supervisory position effective either after the end of the school year 
or after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement is an 
exclusive management prerogative. However, since chapter 150E does 
15 See id. at 399-401, 343 N.E.2d at 146-47. The case was before the Court on direct 
review of the superior court's decision vacating the arbitrator's award. [d. at 401, 343 
N.E.2d at 147. 
16 [d. at 401, 343 N.E.2d at 147. Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 5, provides: "The terms of 
any collective bargaining agreement in effect prior to the effective date of this act shall 
remain in full force and effect until the expiration date of said agreement." 
17 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 401-02, 343 N.E.2d at 147. 
181d. at 401, 343 N.E.2d at 147. 
1"ld. at 404, 343 N.E.2d at 148. 
20 [d. at 403-04,343 N.E.2d at 148. 
21 [d. at 404-05, 343 N.E.2d at 148-49. 
22 [d. at 406, 343 N.E.2d at 149, quoting Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. 
Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 617, 339 N.E.2d 132, 134, 376 
N.Y.S. 2d 427,429 (1975). 
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not contain a management rights clause, the Court and the Labor Re-
lations Commission will have to continue to define and refine the 
parameters of exclusive management prerogatives on a case-by-case 
basis. 
§6.5. Funding of School Personnel: Collective Bargaining 
Agreements Negotiated Pursuant to Chapter 150E. Pursuant to the 
laws of the Commonwealth, the school committee of Boston possesses 
somewhat less budgetary discretion than other school committees 
within the state. Generally, a local school committee is empowered to 
determine the amount necessary for the maintenance of the school 
system, and the appropriate local authority is required to appropriate 
that amount. 1 Should the local authority fail to appropriate the neces-
sary funds, a so-called "ten taxpayer suit" may be instituted in the 
superior court pursuant to section 34 of chapter 71 of the General 
Laws to compel the town to provide the necessary funds. 2 In contrast, 
the Boston School Committee is empowered to make appropriations 
up to a statutorily determined maximum.3 Pursuant to section 2 of 
chapter 224 of the Acts of 1936, however, any requests for appropria-
tions beyond the set maximum must be directed, through the mayor, 
to the city council. Moreover, such requests are subject to the mayor's 
approval,4 and the Supreme Judicial Court has held that a section 34 
remedy is unavailable should the mayor deny approval or the city 
council reject the appropriation request. 5 
In a significant Suroey year decision, Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 
(BTU) v. School Committee of Boston,6 the Supreme Judicial Court ex-
amined and clarified the relationship of the special Boston school 
funding laws and the more recently enacted and more general public 
§ 6.5. 1 C.L. c. 71, § 34. For the text of this section, see note 2 infra. 
2 C.L. c. 71, § 34, provides in part: 
Every city and town shall annually provide an amount of money sufficient for 
the support of the public schools as required by this chapter. Upon petition to the 
superior court, sitting in equity, against a city or town, brought by ten or more 
taxable inhabitants thereof, or by the mayor of a city, or by the attorney general, 
alleging that the amount necessary in such city or town for the support of public 
schools as aforesaid has not been included in the annual budget appropriations for 
said year, said court may determine the amount of the deficiency, if any, and may 
order such city and all of its officers whose action is necessary to carry out such 
order, or such town and its treasurer, selectmen and assessors to provide a sum of 
money equal to such deficiency, together with a sum equal to twenty-five per cent 
thereof. 
For a discussion of this section, see Pirrone v. City of Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 406-07, 
305 N.E.2d 96, 99-100 (1973). 
3 Acts of 1936, c. 224, § 2. 
4 See Pirrone v. City of Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 405-06, 305 N .E.2d 96, 99 (1973). The 
relevant language of the Acts of 1936, c. 224, § 2, provides that U[nlothing in this sec-
tion shall prevent the mayor, on request of the school committee, from recommending 
and the city council from passing additional appropriations for school purposes." 
5364 Mass. at 413, 305 N.E.2d at 103. 
61976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515,350 N.E.2d 707. 
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employee collective bargaining statute. 7 In addition, in that decision 
the Court again addressed itself to the question of arbitration's role in 
teacher-school committee labor disputes. 
In Boston Teachers Union, the city, declaring that the school depart-
ment was spending at a rate which if continued would result in a 1.4 
million dollar deficit, ordered the school committee to cease hiring 
substitutes. The committee, while objecting to the mayor's directive, 
nevertheless did cease hiring substitutes, and the union immediately 
filed a grievance.s The school committee answered by admitting all of 
the allegations, including violation of the collective bargaining con-
tract, and agreed to arbitration. 9 The arbitrator found for the union 
and directed that the school committee could not "hereafter unilater-
ally discontinue the hiring of daily substitutes during the term of the 
existing Agreement."lO In addition, the arbitrator ordered the school 
committee "and/or" the city to pay over fifty thousand dollars into the 
Boston Teachers Union Scholarship as damages for the breach of the 
collective bargaining agreement. ll The superior court confirmed the 
arbitrator's award and also entered a judgment setting forth the 
duties of the mayor and the school committee relative to the hiring of 
substitute teachers.12 
7 C.L. c. 150E. 
81976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1517-18,350 N.E.2d at 711. 
9 [d. at 1518-19,350 N.E.2d at 711. 
10 [d. at 1520,350 N.E.2d at 712. 
11 [d. 
l2[d. at 1521,350 N.E.2d at 712. The judgment stated: 
[A] The School Committee of the City of Boston is obligated in accordance with 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between that Committee and the 
Boston Teachers' Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, 
A.F.L.-C.I.O. to hire substitute teachers to cover classes of regularly assigned 
teachers when they are absent. 
[B] The School Committee of the City of Boston can enter binding contracts 
with the Boston Teachers' Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, 
A.F.L.-C.I.O. in excess of the appropriations available to it; and, in that event, the 
Mayor of the City of Boston is required to submit a sufficient appropriation to the 
Boston City Council, for that Council's approval or rejection, so that, if approved, 
that appropriation will provide the funds necessary to implement the cost Items in 
the provisions in the contracts entered into between the School Committee of the 
City of Boston and the Boston Teachers' Union. 
[Cj When the Mayor of the City of Boston fails to submit a sufficient appropria-
tion to the Boston City Council to implement the cost items in the provisions in the 
contracts entered into between the School Committee of the City of Boston and 
the Boston Teachers' Union, the funds necessary to implement the provisions in 
said contracts may be expended by that School Committee in excess of the ap-
propriations available to said Committee. 
[D] The School Committee of the City of Boston and its members, the City of 
Boston and its Mayor and Auditor, and the officers, employees and agents of any 
of them are permanently enjoined from in 'my way interfering with, preventing 
and/or impairing the hiring and payment of substitute teachers to cover classes of 
regularly assigned teachers when they are absent, unless the provisions of G.L. c. 
149, § 1781, are complied within periods prior to July I, 1974, and the provisions 
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On direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the city challenged 
both the arbitrator's award and the superior court's declaratory judg-
ment. The city first contended that the hiring of substitute teachers 
was not a proper subject for collective bargaining and that accordingly 
any arbitration decision involving substitutes based on the agreement 
was invalid. 13 The Court rejected this claim by concluding, without 
supporting rationale, that class size and teaching load were proper 
bargaining subjects, and that the "manner in which a school 
committee's agreement concerning class size and teaching load will be 
carried out may be the subject of collective bargaining .... "14 Accord-
ingly, the Court found that the hiring of substitutes was a proper bar-
gaining subject.1s 
The Court then addressed the issue of whether the school 
committee's agreement on the hiring of substitutes, regardless of its 
subject matter propriety, was nevertheless unenforceable by the arbi-
trator insofar as it infringed on the school committee's managerial 
prerogative. The Court, while not reaching the question of whether 
the school committee had the managerial right during the term of the 
agreement to change its stance on class size and teaching load,16 
found that the committee's hiring freeze was not based on educational 
policies, but on financial strictures imposed on the committee by the 
mayorY As such, the Court ruled that, unlike in School Committee of 
Braintree v. Raymond,18 the arbitrator's decision did not infringe on the 
committee's managerial prerogatives.19 
The city next contended that the arbitrator's award was invalid 
since at the same time the school committee refused to hire substi-
tutes, there were no appropriated, uncommitted funds available to 
pay the substitutes.2o While the Court agreed with the city that "the 
award was valid only if appropriated, uncommitted funds in the 
school budget established according to law were available for the hir-
ing of substitute teachers at the times the school committee refused to 
of C.L. c. 150E, § 7 are complied with beginning July I, 1974. 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1538 n.l0, 350 N.E.2d at 718 n.lO. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1521-22, 350 N.E.2d at 712. 
14/d. at 1526, 350 N.E.2d at 714. 
IS [d. at 1525.350 N.E.2d at 713. 
16 On this question the Court noted: 
Even assuming, but not deciding, that the school committee had the right during 
the term of the agreement to change its view of proper class size and teaching load 
and of the use of substitute teachers as matters of educational policy, and thus to 
ignore its agreement on these subjects, the facts here show that no change of edu-
cational policy was involved. 
/d. at 1526-27,350 N.E.2d at 714. 
17Id. at 1527, 350 N.E.2d at 714. 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. For a discussion of Braintree, see § 6.4 
supra. 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1527-28,350 N.E.2d at 714. 
2°Id. at 1529,350 N.E.2d at 715. 
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hire substitute teachers,"21 it ruled that the union had carried its bur-
den of showing sufficient funds in the appropriate budget classifica-
tion, and that the city had subsequently not met its burden of estab-
lishing that the apparently available funds had been in fact expended 
or committed at the time of the hiring freeze. 22 The city then argued 
that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in ordering the city to 
pay damages into the teachers' scholarship fund. 23 The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court agreed, noting that the arbitrator's damage award was not 
properly directed at providing relief for those teachers harmed by the 
hiring freeze. 24 
The city's last argument was a challenge to the superior court's 
grant of declaratory relief. In particular, the city challenged that part 
of the court's order which required the school committee to expend 
funds in excess of available appropriations if the mayor failed to sub-
mit a sufficient appropriation to the city council. 25 In response to this 
final challenge by the city, and at the urging of the teachers' union, 
the Court discussed the roles of the mayor and the school committee 
in the funding of collective bargaining obligations within the city of 
Boston. Initially, the Court, in agreeing with the city that the part of 
the superior court's judgment ordering the school committee to ex-
pend unappropriated funds should the mayor fail to submit the re-
quested appropriation was invalid, stated that the proper solution was 
a suit to compel the mayor to make such a submission.26 The city 
strenuously opposed this solution, however, arguing that the special 
school funding laws of Boston give to the mayor an absolute veto over 
any school committee request for additional appropriations. 27 
In answering the city's opposition to the Court's solution with re-
spect to the order requiring the school to expend unappropriated 
funds, the Court looked to the language of chapter 150E, a statute 
the Court believed should be harmonized with the provisions of the 
special Boston funding laws. The Court noted that section 7 of chap-
ter 150E requires an employer to "submit to the appropriate legisla-
ture body within thirty days after the date on which the agreement is 
executed by the parties, a request for an appropriation necessary to 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1530-32,350 N.E.2d at 715-16. 
23 Id. at 1533,350 N.E.2d at 716. 
24Id. at 1535,350 N.E.2d at 717. 
2. See id. at 1536-41, 350 N.E.2d at 717-18. For the relevant part of the superior 
court's judgment, see note 12 supra, paragraph C. The city also challenged paragraph D 
of the court's order, see note 12 supra, which paragraph enjoined the city and the 
committee from interfering with the hiring of substitutes, unless the provisions of G.L. 
c. 150E, § 7, or G.L. c. 149, § 1781, were met. The Supreme Judicial Court found for 
the city, ruling that the injunction was too broad and indefinite since these sections 
were not "uncontrovertibly clear." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1540,350 N.E.2d at 718. 
26 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1539,350 N.E.2d at 718. 
27 Id. at 1541, 350 N.E.2d at 719. See text and notes at notes 1-5 supra. 
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fund the cost items contained therein .... "28 The Court also noted 
that under chapter 150E an "employer" in a city is the city itself, and 
that in the case of school employees, the school committee is the city's 
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.29 Moreover, 
under section 1 of chapter 150E, the words "legislative body" are de-
fined as the city council when the "employer" is a city.30 Accordingly, 
the Court found that section 7 of chapter 150E requires the mayor to 
submit additional requests for appropriations aimed at funding school 
employee collective bargaining agreements despite the provisions of 
the special Boston statutes. The Court justified this result on the 
ground that it preserved the mayor's veto power as much as possible 
"without thwarting the legislative intent of C.L. c. 150E that a school 
committee's request for appropriations be submitted to the appropri-
ate legislative body."31 
Boston Teachers Union demonstrates the willingness of the Court to 
pass on critical issues involving an arbitrator's awards. By ruling that 
class size and teaching load are proper subjects for collective bargain-
ing, the Court adopted an ad hoc method of dealing with the subject 
of the proper scope of public employee collective bargaining. This 
procedure has deprived the Court of the Labor Relations 
Commission's expertise in this area and will burden the Commission 
in its efforts to formulate a coherent policy on the subject. In addi-
tion, Boston Teachers Union read in the light of School Committee of 
Hanover v. Curry32 and School Committee of Braintree v. Raymond33 indi-
cates that while a particular matter may be an appr~iate subject for 
bargaining, any agreement reached on that matter is subject to unilat-
eral modification by the employer if that matter is deemed to be a 
management prerogative. Accordingly, if labor relations stability is to 
be achieved in the public sector, it would appear that the Commission 
and the courts must not only define the parameters of the scope of 
collective bargaining, but also the parameters of managerial preroga-
tives. While the Court in Boston Teachers Union called for legislative ac-
tion in defining these parameters,34 it would appear that a viable al-
ternative would be for the Commission to formulate policies defining 
and verifying these necessary boundaries. 
§6.6. Public Employees: Definition. During the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court for the first time examined the scope of the 
2" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1543,350 N.E.2d at 710, quoting G.L. c. 150E, § 7. 
29 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1543, 350 N.E.2d at 719, citing G.L. c. 150E, § 1. 
30 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1543-44, 350 N.E.2d at 719:20. 
31Id. at 1546, 350 N.E.2d at 720. 
32 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144. For a discussion of Hanover, see § 6.4 
supra. 
331976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. For a discussion of Braintree, see § 6.4 
supra. 
34 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1528 n.5, 350 N.E.2d at 714 n.5. 
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definitional section of the public employer collective bargaining law. 1 
In Massachusetts Probation Association (MPA) v. Commission of 
. Administration, 2 the Court concluded that the public employee statute 
does not extend to nonexecutive state employees.3 Specifically at issue 
in MPA was whether probation officers were public employees. 
In MPA, the probation officers association in its original petition 
sought a declaration of whether probation officers were entitled to 
collective bargaining rights under the then existing state employee col-
lective bargaining law.4 The petition was instituted after the Commit-
tee on Probation5 informed the association that the Committee did 
not consider itself the employer of the probation officers and there-
fore would not continue to bargain. 6 With the passage of chapter 
150E, which chapter repealed and superseded the state employee col-
lective bargaining law,7 the association filed an amended petition, 
seeking a declaration of whether "probation officers are 'public em-
ployees' within the meaning of the ... public employee collective bar-
gaining statute [chapter 150E] .... "8 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in addressing the definitional ques-
tion, first acknowledged the parties' apparent stipulation that the pro-
bation officers were employees of the judicial branch of the 
government. 9 The Court next turned to section 1 of chapter 150E of 
the General Laws, which defines a public employee as "any person 
employed by a public employer .... "10 Since the parties had conceded 
that the probation officers were employees of the judiciary, the issue 
before the Court was whether the judiciary was a public employer. 
With respect to this question, the Court noted initially that section 1 
"defines 'public employer' as 'the commonwealth acting through the 
commissioner of administration [or his designee] ... ,' "11 and further 
§6.6} G.L. c. 150E, § 1. 
21976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1814,352 N.E.2d 684. 
3 [d. at 1834, 352 N.E.2d at 691. Executive employees are those employees of entities 
within the executive branch of government. See id. at 1829-30, 352 N.E.2d at 690. 
'[d. at 1814 n.2, 1818,352 N.E.2d at 684 n.2, 686. G.L. c. 149, § 178F, was the then 
existing state employee collective bargaining law. Prior to the enactment of chapter 150E, 
the general municipal employee collective bargaining law, G.L. c. 149, §§ 178G-178N, did 
not extend to state employees. 
• -"The Committee on Probation is composed of the Chief Justice of the Superior 
Court, the Chief Justice of the Probate Court, the Chief Justice of the Municipal Court 
of the City of Boston, the Chief Justice of the District Courts, and two persons ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1818 n.6, 352 N.E.2d at 686 n.6 (citation omitted). 
8 [d. at 1818, 352 N.E.2d at 686. In 1971, the Labor Relations Commission certified, 
after election, the association as the exclusive bargaining agent for the probation offi-
cers and had designated the Committee on Probation as the probation officers' em-
ployer.[d. at 1817-18, 352 N.E.2d at 685-86. 
7 G.L. c. 150E, as enacted by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 2. 
81976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1814-15, 352 N.E.2d at 684-85. 
9 [d. at 1823, 352 N.E.2d at 687. 
10 G.L. c. 150E, § 1. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1826, 352 N.E.2d at 688, citing G.L. c. 150E, § 1. 
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noted that the Commissioner of Administration IS an officer within 
the executive branch of the government. 12 
The Court then examined the responsibilities of the Commissioner 
as defined by sections 3 and 4 of chapter 7 of the General Laws. 13 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1827, 352 N.E.2d at 689. 
13 G.L. c. 7, § 3, provides: 
The executive office for administration and finance shall serve as the principal 
agency of the executive department of the government of the commonwealth for 
the following purposes: 
(1) Developing, co-ordinating, administering and controlling the financial policies 
and programs of the commonwealth; 
(2) Supervising the organization and conauct of the business affairs of the de-
partments, commissions, offices, boards, divisions, institutions and other agencies 
within the executive department of the government of the commonwealth; 
(3) Developing new policies and programs which will improve the organization, 
structure, functions, economy, efficiency, procedures, services and administrative 
practices of all such departments, commissions, offices, boards, divisions, institu-
tions and other agencies. 
Id., § 4, provides: 
The governor shall appoint a comm1SSlOner of administration, who shall be a 
person of ability and experience. He shall serve at the pleasure of the governor, 
shall receive such salary not exceeding twenty thousand dollars per year as the 
governor may determine, and shall devote his full time during business hours to 
the duties of his office. Except in the cases of the comptroller's division and the 
purchasing agent's division, each as established under section four A, the commis-
sioner shall be responsible for the exercise of all powers and the performance of 
all duties assigned by law to the executive office for administration and finance· or 
to any division, bureau or other administrative unit or agency under the said of-
fice. He shall be the executive and administrative head of the said office; and 
every division, bureau, section and other administrative unit and agency within the 
said office, other than the comptroller's division and the purchasing agent's divi-
sion, shall be under his direction, control and supervision. He shall have access to 
all books, papers, documents, records and equipment in the custody of the 
comptroller's division and the purchasing agent's division; and the comptroller and 
purchasing agent shall furnish him with all information requested by him for the 
purpose of discharging the duties of the office of commissioner of administration. 
He shall act as the executive officer of the governor in all matters pertaining to the 
financial, administrative, planning and policy co-ordinating functions and affairs of 
the departments, commissions, offices, boards, divisions, institutions and other 
agencies within the executive department of the government of the common-
wealth. He shall inquire into the business affairs of the commonwealth and the 
laws governing them; shall supervise program planning and the co-ordination of 
the activities and programs of the commonwealth in its dealings with the federal 
government; shall review and report to the governor and the general court on all 
proposed legislation affecting the organization, structure, efficiency and adminis-
trative functions, services, procedures and practices of the departments, commis-
sions, offices, boards, divisions, institutions and other agencies, or any of them, 
under the executive department of the government of the commonwealth; shall 
conduct studies of the operations of the said agencies with a view to effecting im-
provements in administrative organization, procedures, and practices and to 
promoting economy, efficiency, and avoiding of useless labor and expenses in the 
said agencies; shall from time to time recommend to the governor and the general 
court such changes as he shall deem desirable in the laws relating to the organiza-
tion, structure, efficiency or administrative functions, services, procedures and 
practices of any such agency or agencies; and shall have such other powers and 
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The Court asserted that the functions set forth in sections 3 and 4 ex-
tended "primarily, if not exclusively, to the executive branch of the 
government .... "14 Accordingly, the Court concluded that "it would 
be anomalous to interpret c. 150E, § I, as covering State employees 
not employed in the executive branch of government."15 In addition, 
the Court examined the prior state employee collective bargaining 
law, and based on a comparison of the language of that statute with 
the language of sections 3 and 4 of chapter 7, concluded that the 
prior law applied only to executive employees.16 The Court then ex-
amined the legislative history of chapter 150E and determined that 
the General Court did not intend to broaden the coverage of the act 
to include nonexecutive employees.17 
Finally, the Court pointed out that section 7 of chapter 150E enum-
erates those statutes which, in the case of conflict, are to be overrid-
den by collective bargaining agreements arrived at pursuant to chap-
ter 150E. After noting that section 7 does not list those statutes gov-
erning the wages and terms of employment of probation officers,18 
the Court went on to state that "the statutes relating to State em-
loyees which are specified in § 7 apply only to employees clearly 
within the executive branch."19 Accordingly, the Court ruled that 
probation officers are not public employees and that "public em-
ployee" as used in chapter 150E does not include nonexecutive 
employees.2o 
While the MPA decision involved only judicial employees, the 
Court's analysis and conclusion leave little doubt that the scope of 
chapter 150E has been defined to exclude all nonexecutive state em-
ployees. This result will make future determinations of what employee 
groups fall into the nonexecutive category critical. 
§ 6.7. Binding Arbitration: Town of Arlington v. Board of Concilia-
tion and Arbitration. 1 In a m<tior Survey year decision discussed in detail 
in a later section,2 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld as constitu-
tional the state's binding arbitration statute.3 This statute provides for 
duties as shall be assigned to him by statute and may from time to time be as-
signed to him by the governor in accordance with law. In making any examination 
or investigation authorized under this chapter, the commission may require the 
production of books, papers, contracts and documents relating to any matter 
within the scope of such examination or investigation. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1829,352 N.E.2d at 690. 
10 /d. 
16Id. at 1830,352 N.E.2d at 690. 
17/d. at 1831-32,352 N.E.2d at 690-91. 
18 C.L. c. 276, §§ 83-99C. 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sb. at 1833,352 N.E.2d at 691. 
20/d. at 1833-34,352 N.E.2d at 691. 
§ 6.7. ' 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2035, 352 N.E.2d 914. For a more extensive discussion 
of Town Of Arlington, see § 6.10 infra. 
2 See § 6.10 infra. 
3 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4. 
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so-called "last and best offer" arbitration for the police and fire fight-
ers of any city, town, or district where a collective bargaining impasse 
has continued for thirty days after the publication of a factfinder's re-
port made pursuant to section 9 of chapter 150E of the General 
Laws.4 In general, the procedure requires that the parties submit to a 
panel of three arbitrators the bargaining issues in dispute. The arbi-
tration panel conducts a hearing at the end of which the disputing 
parties submit to the panel a statement of their "last and best offer" 
on each issue in dispute. A m<uority of the arbitration panel then 
selects one of the two statements. The selection is final and binding 
upon "the parties and upon the appropriate legislative body."5 
4 The § 9 procedures that must be followed prior to the institution of binding arbitra-
tion are as follows: 
After a reasonable period of negotiation over the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, either party or the parties acting jointly may petition the board for 
a determination of the existence of an impasse. Upon receipt of such petition, the 
board shall commence an investigation forthwith to determine if the parties have 
negotiated for a reasonable period of time and if an impasse exists, within ten days 
of the receipt of such petition, the board shall notify the parties of the results of its 
investigation. Failure to notify the parties within ten days shall be taken to mean 
that an impasse exists. 
Within five days after such determination, the board shall appoint a mediator to 
assist the parties in the resolution of the impasse. In the alternative, the parties 
may agree upon a person to serve as a mediator and shall notify the board of such 
agreement and choice of mediator. 
After a reasonable period of mediation, not to exceed twenty days from the date 
of appointment, said mediator shall issue to the board a report indicating the re-
sults of his services in resolving the impasse. 
If the impasse continues after the conclusion of mediation, either party or the 
parties acting jointly may petition the board to initiate fact-finding proceedings. 
Upon receipt of such petition, the board shall appoint a fact-finder, representative 
of the public, from a list of qualified persons maintained by the board. In the al-
ternative, the parties may agree upon a person to serve as fact-finder and shall 
notify the board of such agreement and choice of fact-finder. No person shall be 
named as a fact-finder who has represented an employer or employee organization 
within the preceding twelve months. The fact-finder shall be subject to the rules of 
the board and shall, in addition to powers delegated to him by the board, have the 
power to mediate and to make recommendations for the resolution of the impasse. 
The fact-finder shall transmit his findings and any recommendations for the res-
olution of the impasse to the board and to both parties within thirty days after the 
date of his appointment. If the impasse remains unresolved ten days after the 
transmittal of such findings and recommendations, the board shall make them 
public .... 
5 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4, provides in part: 
If an employee organization duly recognized as representing the firefighters or 
police officers of a city, town or district is engaged in an impasse which has con-
tinued for thirty days after the publication of the fact-finder's report pursuant to 
section nine of chapter one hundred and fifty E, said employee organization shall 
petition the board to make an investigation. If, after investigation, the board de-
termined that: (1) the requirements of section nine of chapter one hundred and 
fifty E have been complied with in good faith by the employee organization; (2) 
thirty days have passed since the date of publication of the fact-finders report pur-
suant to said section nine; (3) the proceedings for the prevention of any prohibited 
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In Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration,6 this pro-
cedure was challenged by the town as violative of the Home Rule 
Amendment,7 as improperly delegating legislative power to private 
individuals, as contravening the "one-man, one-vote" principle ex-
pressed in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and as conflicting with other General Laws regulating municipal 
finance. s 
With respect to the home rule challenge, the Court simply noted 
that while the grant of authority to municipalities was broad, section 8 
of the Home Rule Amendment reserved to the General Court "the 
power to act in relation to cities and towns . . . by general laws which 
apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to 
a class of not fewer than two .... "9 Since there was no doubt that the 
binding arbitration statute was a general law, the Court found the 
statute to be consistent with the Home Rule Amendment. In addition, 
practices have been exhausted, provided that any such complaints have been filed 
with the commission, prior to the date of the fact-finder's report; and (4) an im-
passe exists, the board shall immediately notify the employer and the employee 
organization that the issues in dispute shall be resolved by a three-member arbitra-
tion panel. 
Said panel shall be comprised of three arbitrators, one selected by the employer, 
one selected by the employee organization, and a third an impartial arbitrator, 
who shall act as chairman of the panel, who shall be selected by the two previously 
selected arbitrators. In the event that either party fails to select an arbitrator ... 
the board shall appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators necessary to complete the 
panel, which shall act with the same force and effect as if the panel had been 
selected without intervention by the board. 
The arbitration panel shall, acting through its chairman, hold a hearing within 
ten days after the date of appointment of the chairman . . . . The chairman shall 
give at least seven days notice in writing to each of the other arbitrators, and to 
the representatives of the municipal employer and employee organization of the 
time and place of such hearing. The chairman shall preside over the hearing and 
shall take testimony .... 
A record of the proceedings shall be kept, and the chairman shall arrange for 
the necessary recording service .... At the conclusion of the hearing, each party 
shall submit a written statement containing its last and best offer for each of the 
issues in dispute to the panel, which shall take said statements under advisement. 
Within ten days after the conclusion of the hearing, a majority of the panel shall 
select one of the two written statements and shall immediately give written notice 
of selection to the parties. The selection shall be final and binding upon the parties 
and upon the appropriate legislative body .... 
Any determination or decision of the arbitration panel if supported by material 
and substantive evidence on the whole record shall be binding upon the parties 
and may be enforced at the instance of either party or of the arbitration panel in 
the superior court in equity; provided, that the scope of arbitration in police mat-
ters shall be limited to wages, hours and conditions of employment and shall not 
include the following matters of inherent managerial policy: the right to appoint, 
promote, assign and transfer employees. 
81976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2035, 352 N.E.2d 914. 
7 MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89. 
81976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2036-37,352 N.E.2d at 916. 
9/d. at 2040,352 N.E.2d at 918, quoting MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89, § 8. 
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the Court asserted that it could no longer be doubted that the Legisla-
ture has the power to legislate in the area of municipal wages and 
benefits.lO 
In responding to the town's challenge that binding arbitration con-
stituted an improper delegation of legislative power, the Court held 
that the Legislature could dele sate the implementation or administra-
tion of policies to private individuals, so long as proper safeguards 
were provided. ll The Court accordingly focused on the issue of 
whether the statute's safeguards were sufficient to avoid the possibility 
of arbitrary or capricious action by the delegee. Finding adequate 
statutory standards,12 the Court concluded that the delegation in-
volved in the binding arbitration statute was valid. 13 
The town's "one-man, one-vote" challenge was summarily dismissed 
by the Court. The Court asserted that the "one-man, one-vote" con-
cept could not apply unless the arbitration panel was exercising gen-
eral legislative power.14 The Court concluded, however, that the res-
olution of a "collective bargaining impasse by selecting between the 
two final offers of the parties" did not involve general legislative 
power. IS 
The town's final constitutional challenge based on an alleged con-
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2041, 352 N .E.2d at 918. 
llld. at 2045, 352 N.E.2d at 920. 
12 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4, provides the following standards for arbitrators: 
The factors among others, to be given weight by the arbitration panel in arriving 
at a decision shall include: 
(I) The financial ability of the municipality to meet costs. 
(2) The interests and welfare of the public. 
(3) The hazards of employment, physical, education, and mental qualifications, 
job training and skills involved. 
(4) A comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the em-
ployees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours and condi-
tions of employment of other employees performing similar services and with 
other employees generally in public and private employment in comparable com-
munities. 
(5) The decisions and recommendations of the fact finder. 
(6) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as 
the cost of living. 
(7) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, including di-
rect wages and fringe benefits. 
(8) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the 
arbitration proceedings. 
(9) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or 
traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and 
conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-
finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties in the public service or in pri-
vate employment. 
(10) The stipulation of the parties. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 352 N.E.2d at 920. 
141d. at 2047, 352 N.E.2d at 920, citing Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 
(1968); Sailors v. Board of Educ. of the County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105 (1967). 
I~ 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047,352 N.E.2d at 920-21. 
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flict between the binding arbitration statute and other General Laws 
regulating the conduct of municipal finance was also summarily dis-
missed by the Court. In dismissing the challenge, the Court noted that 
while section 31 of chapter 44 of the General Laws sets controls on 
"irresponsible spending by departments of local governments," that 
section goes on to provide that the function of the section "is not to 
bar local spending ... required by a valid State program."16 Accord-
ingly, the Court concluded that it saw "no problem in requiring spe-
cial action by the town through its finance committee and town meet-
ing to meet by appropriation the award of the arbitrators."17 
In closing, the Court noted that much of the town's brief was de-
voted to challenging what were in effect legislative policy decisions. 
The Court asserted that these challenges should therefore be directed 
to the General Court. 18 The binding arbitration statute by its terms 
expires on June 30, 1977.19 While the Court's decision in Town of 
Arlington apparently lays to rest the question of the statute's constitu-
tionality, the town will no doubt find a forum for its policy issues 
when the Legislature addresses the question of the renewal of the 
binding arbitration statute. 
§ 6.S. Prohibited Labor Practices Under Chapter 150E. The 
question of whether a violation of section 17SL(1) of chapter 149 of 
the General Laws l depends upon the existence of a recognized or cer-
tified union was decided during the Survey year by the Appeals Court 
in Stoughton School Committee v. Labor Relations Commission. 2 Although 
the Stoughton case arose under section 17SL(1) of the now repealed 
bargaining statute, 3 section 17 SL( 1) is substantially the same as section 
lO(a)(l) of the new collective bargaining statute. 4 Accordingly, the 
case can be viewed as suggesting the present status of the law. 
In Stoughton, the teacher, clerical, and library aides had sought to 
form a union. The school committee, apparently in response to the 
18/d. at 2048-49, 352 N.E.2d at 921, citing G.L. c. 44, § 31. 
17 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049,352 N.E.2d at 921. 
1sld. at 2049-50, 352 N.E.2d at 921-22. 
18 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 8. 
§6.8. 1 Section 178L was repealed by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 1. The subject matter is 
now covered in G.L. c. 150E, § 10, which was enacted by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 2. 
Prior to its repeal, § 178L(I) provided in part: "Municipal employers or their represen-
tatives or agents are prohibited from:-(I) interfering with, restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section one hundred and seventy-
eight .... " 'Section 178(H) provided in Part: "(1) Employees shall have, and be pro-
tected in the exercise of, the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist any em-
ployee organization .... " 
2 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 509, 346 N.E.2d 129. 
3 G.L. c. 149, §§ 178D, 178F-178N, repealed by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § I, replaced by 
G.L. c. 150E, as enacted by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 2. 
• G.L. c. 150E, § lO(a)(l) provides: "(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public 
employer or its designated representative to: ... (I) Interfere, restrain, or coerce any 
employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under this chapter .... " 
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unionization of the aides,5 voted to change all such aide pOSItIons 
from full-time to part-time.6 The committee action resulted in the res-
ignation of those aides who needed full-time positions.7 The aides fIled 
a petition for certification and a complaint alleging violation of section 
178L. 8 The Labor Relations Commission, finding that the union had 
been recognized, granted the requested certification and ordered the 
school committee to cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good 
faith. In addition, the Commission ordered the committee to restore 
the aides' hours and pay to their original status, to offer employment 
to those aides who had resigned because of the new program, and to 
provide back pay to the aides to compensate them for any wages lost 
under the new program.9 In reviewing the Commission's findings and 
orders, the superior court ruled that the Commission's finding as to 
union recognition by the school committee was unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence, and that "[a]bsent such recognition, the findings 
with respect to unfair labor practices cannot stand."10 
The Appeals Court reviewed the conflicting testimony on the issue 
of whether the union had been recognized, but despite the 
Commission's argument to the contrary, the court held that no recog-
nition had been granted. ll Nevertheless, responding to the underlying 
unfair labor practice charges, the court held that election, certifica-
tion, or recognition of the union was unnecessary in order for there 
to be a violation of section 178L( 1).12 The court reasoned that such a 
result was mandated since "[o]therwise an employer could fire at will 
any employee who attempted to form or participate in an employee 
organization ... [thus] render[ing] the right of self-organization 
meaningless. "13 The Appeals Court, rather than recommitting the 
case to the superior court, took the record before it and on the sub-
stantial evidence on the record found that the Commission could 
5 The school committee's vote to change the aides' positions to part-time occurred at 
the same meeting in which the union had presented its claim for recognition. In addi-
tion, there was evidence that the committee believed that the aides, if part-time em-
ployees, would be ineligible for collective bargaining. 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
511. 346 N.E.2d at 132. 
aId. 
TId. 
81d. at 512, 346 N.E.2d at 132. 
BId. at 512-13, 346 N.E.2d at 133. 
10/d. at 513-14,346 N.E.2d at 133. 
llId. at 514-16, 346 N.E.2d at 133-34. The Commission's position was based on the 
statement of one committee member to the union representative. The alleged statement 
was that "[rlecognition is yours, if that's what you wish; but we do not wish to enter into 
professional negotiations." Id. at 515,346 N.E.2d at 133. The Appeals Court, while not-
ing that recognition can be conferred orally, found that it had not been shown that the 
committee member had the authority to bind the committee.ld. at 515-16, 346 N.E.2d 
at 133-34. 
l'ld. at 517,346 N.E.2d at 134. 
13Id. at 518-19,346 N.E.2d at 135. 
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properly find a section 178L(l) violation.14 
In addition to the challenge to the recognition finding, the school 
committee also argued that the Commission lacked authority to im-
pose a back pay remedy in the instant case since there had been no 
discharge.15 The Appeals Court responded to this argument by indi-
cating that those aides who left the school committee's employ because 
they required full-time employment had been constructively 
discharged. 16 The court further held that the law did not require ac-
tual discharge where the actions had a coercive impact. Accordingly, 
as to those who remained, the court permitted a back pay award, 
holding that to do otherwise would have discriminated against those 
who had not left the school committee's employY 
Clearly in Stoughton the court was not going to permit the school 
committee to use its own improper actions as a defense to back pay 
awards, nor was it going to permit the narrow reading of the 
Commission's remedial authority proffered by the school committee. 
Thus, the Stoughton decision should be viewed as reaffirming the 
Commission's role in preserving public employees' collective bargain-
ing rights, as well as defining in part the scope of the prohibited prac-
tices set out in section 178L(I) of chapter 149 and subsections (1) and 
(3) of section 1O(a)18 of chapter 150E, the new public employee collec-
tive bargaining law. 
§6.9. Miscellaneous Labor Relations Commission Decisions. In 
two important cases coming before the Labor Relations Commission 
during the Survey year, the Commission, in somewhat controversial 
opinions, distinguished its views from ~hose expressed by the National 
Labor Relations Board. In the first matter, the Commission denied an 
employer-law firm's motion to dismiss a certification petition filed by 
the employees of the firm. In a second case, the Commission granted 
recognition to interns, residents, and fellows at a municipal hospital. 
I. JURISDICTION 
In a 1973 decision, Bodle, Fogel, lulber, Reinhardt, and Rothschild, I the 
National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") refused to assert juris-
14/d. at 519, 346 N.E.2d at 135. 
15/d. at 520, 346 N.E.2d at 135. G.L. c. 149, § 178L, provided in part: "[The 
Commission] shall order the reinstatement with or without back pay of an employee 
discharged or discriminated against in violation of the first paragraph of this section." 
18 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 521,346 N.E.2d at 135. 
17 Id. at 521-23, 346 N.E.2d at 135-36. 
18 G.L. c. 150E, § IO(a)(3), provides: "(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public 
employer or its designated representative to: ... (3) Discriminate in regard to hiring, 
tenure, or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any employee organization .... " For the text of § 10(a)(I), see note 4 supra. 
§6.9. I 206 N.L.R.B. 512,84 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1973). 
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diction over law firms.2 The particular law firm before the Board in 
Bodle, Fogel was composed of five attorney-partners and seven 
attorney-associates. The firm annually received revenues in excess of 
$500,000, of which over $50,000 constituted out-of-state receipts. 
Moreover, a number of the firm's clients were engaged in interstate 
commerce.3 
In addressing the jurisdictional question, the Board initially noted 
that given the firm's commercial data and the "customarily liberally 
construed 'affecting commerce' test," the Board had the legal author-
ity to assert jurh.diction.4 The Board, however, citing NLRB v. Denver 
Building & Construction Trades Council,5 emphasized that the Board 
could, in its discretion, decline to assert jurisdiction over a complaint 
if the policies of the National Labor Relations Act would not be fur-
thered by asserting jurisdiction.6 Significantly, after acknowledging 
the existence of its discretionary jurisdictional powers, the Board 
chose to address the jurisdictional question as it related to law firms 
generally, rather than as it related to Bodle , Fogel specifically. 7 
In defining the parameters of its jurisdictional discretion, the Board 
indicated that the test was "whether the stoppage of business by 
reason of labor strife would tend substantially to affect commerce."8 
Applying this standard to the operation of law firms, the Board con-
cluded that while a lawyer may "assist in the negotiation and ultimate 
formulation of complex interstate agreements relating to trade and 
business," the lawyer is "cast not in the role of principal, but as helper 
to the party-his client-who is the moving force in commerce."9 Ac-
cordingly, the Board concluded that it was improbable that labor 
strife between lawyers and their employees would result in a substan-
tial interruption in the flow of commerce, regardless of the "high es-
teem" that clients had for their attorneys.10 In addition, the Board, in 
dicta,l1 indicated that it was troubled by the possibility of a conflict of 
2Id. at 514, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323. 
31d. at 512, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323. 
4Id. 
s 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The Supreme Court in Denver Building & Construction Trades 
Council commented on the Board's discretionary jurisdictional powers, not!ng that: 
Even when the effect of activities on interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the 
Board to take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines 
to do so, statin~ that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its asser-
tion of jurisdictIon in that case. 
Id. at 684, cited at 206 N.L.R.B. at 512,84 L.R.R.M. at 1321. 
6206 N.L.R.B. at 512, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1321. 
7Id., 84 L.R.R.M. at 1322. The Board noted: "We deem it appropriate ... at this 
time to consider whether we ought to decline jurisdiction over law firms generally or 
whether we ought to attempt to establish jurisdictional standards and to assert jurisdic-
tion over at least certain classes of law firms." Id. 
8Id. at 513, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1322. 
9Id. 
1°ld. 
11 See id. at 512 n.2, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1321 n.2. 
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interest as well as a possible threat to client confidentiality and the 
sanctity of the lawyer/client privilege if legal employees were 
recognized. 12 
Against the backdrop of Bodle, Fogel, the Massachusetts Labor Rela-
tions Commission during the Survey year denied a motion to dismiss a 
certification petition, which petition had been filed by the employees 
of a law firm. In Foley, Hoag & Eliot v. United File Room Clerks, Messen-
gers, & Library Personnel of Foley, Hoag & Eliot,t3 the employees had 
petitioned the Regional Director of the NLRB for certification. The 
Regional Director, however, relying on the Board's decision in Bodle, 
Fogle dismissed the employees' petition.14 The employees then sought 
certification from the Commission pursuant to section 5 of chapter 
150A of the General Laws.1s In its motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction, respondent Foley, Hoag raised the following issues: (1) 
whether the Commission could assert jurisdiction over the petition de-
spite the preemption doctrine; (2) whether chapter 150A of the Gen-
eral Laws reached employees of a law firm; and (3) whether the 
Commission, assuming it had jurisdiction, should decline to assert that 
jurisdiction for the reasons of inappropriateness, confidentiality, or 
conflict of interest. 16 
In support of its preemption argument, Foley, Hoag initially con-
tended that the dispute at issue was subject to the traditional doctrine 
of preemption as developed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board17 and San Diego Building Trades 
Council v. Garmon,18 since the dispute was not within the purview of 
section 14(c) of the National Labor Relations Act!9 The Supreme 
Court in Guss had held that if the NLRB did not cede jurisdiction to 
state agencies pursuant to section lO(a) of the NLRA,20 those agencies 
could not assert jurisdiction over disputes over which the NLRB had 
declined to assert jurisdiction if the dispute involved a matter en-
trusted by Congress to the NLRB.21 The Supreme Court in Garmon 
defined the parameters of the entrusted matter as being those matters 
arguably protected or prohibited by section 722 and 823 of the 
12/d. at 513-14, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323. 
13 2 M.L.C 1302 (1976). 
14 /d. at 1305. 
15 G.L. c. 150A, § 5(c), provides in part: "Whenever a question affecting industry, 
trade or health care arises concerning the representation of employees, the commission 
may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or 
names of the representatives who have been designated or selected." 
16 2 M.L.C at 1302-03. 
17 353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
18 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
19 2 M.L.C. at 1305. 
20 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). 
21 353 U.S. at 9. 
2229 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). 
231d. § 158. 
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NLRA.21 The result of Cuss and Carmon was to create a "no-man's 
land" wherein parties to certain labor disputes were denied an agency 
forum.25 Section I4(c) of the NLRA was passed to eliminate this 
"no-man's land."26 Section I4(c) establishes state agency jUrIsdiction 
over those labor disputes over which the Board, in its discretion, de-
clines to assert jurisdiction. Section 14(c) provides: 
(c)(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by 
published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute in-
volving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion 
of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not 
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: 
Provided, that the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction 
over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction 
under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959. 
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar 
any agency or the courts of any State or Territory (including the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands), 
from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over 
which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this sub-
section, to assert jurisdiction. 27 
Referring to the language of section 14(c), Foley, Hoag argued that 
the Board had not declined jurisdiction over law firms as a class; that 
the Board's failure to assert jurisdiction over law firms was not based 
solely on a finding of insubstantial impact on commerce; and that the 
Board, applying its 1959 standards, would have asserted jurisdiction 
over law firms.28 Therefore, Foley, Hoag concluded that the tradi-
tional doctrine of preemption was applicable. 
Addressing Foley, Hoag's preemption argument, the Commission 
first noted that the Regional Director of the Board had dismissed the 
employees' petition based on the Board's decision in Bodle, Fogel. 29 
The Commission then examined the Bodle, Fogel decision and pointed 
to language in that decision which "beyond per adventure" indicated 
that the Board had declined to assert jurisdiction over law firms as a 
24 359 U.S. at 245. 
25 Cox & BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 1218 (7th ed. 1969). 
26 !d. at 1219. 
27 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970). 
28 2 M.L.C. at 1306. Further arguing preemption Foley, Hoag asserted that the 
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, required 
the Commission to follow the Board's Bodle, Fogel precedent and decline jurisdiction. 2 
M.L.C. at 1308. The Commission rejected this contention as "unsupported and untena-
ble" asserting that Foley, Hoag's result would merely "reviv[el the 'no-man's land'" 
sought to be obviated by § 14(c). [d. 
29 2 M.L.C. at 1305. 
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class.30 With respect to Foley, Hoag's second contention that the 
Board's decision was not based solely on a finding of no substantial 
impact on commerce, the Commission asserted that the issue of 
whether or not a decision to decline jurisdiction rests solely on the 
ground of insubstantial impact of interstate commerce is not deter-
minative since section 14(c) does not require insubstantial impact to be 
the sole reason for declining jurisdiction.31 Moreover, the Commission 
indicated that the Board's discussion of confidentiality, conflict of in-
terest, and administrative difficulty in Bodle, Fogel constituted dicta. 32 
The Commission, commenting on Foley, Hoag's third contention, 
simply indicated that the Board's 1959 standards were in the form of 
categories and that these categories never included law firms.33 
Having dismissed Foley, Hoag's preemption arguments, the Com-
mission turned to the question of the applicability of state labor law. 
Section 1 of chapter 150A of the General Laws expresses the state's 
labor policy as the provision of collective bargaining rights for em-
ployees in order to avoid industrial strife which would have the 
"necessary effect of burdening or obstructing industry or trade."34 
Foley, Hoag argued that its activities did not affect industry and trade 
since it was engaged in a "learned profession."35 The Commission 
concluded, however, that the legal services provided by Foley, Hoag 
would affect industry and trade enough to warrant asserting jurisdic-
tion. In this respect, the Commission reasoned that since a law firm's 
activities often facilitate the business interests of its clients, any inter-
ruption of the laws firm's activities would result in an obstruction of 
industry and trade.36 
Finally, the Commission addressed Foley, Hoag's contention that as-
suming the Commission had jurisdiction, it should decline to assert it 
for reasons of inappropriateness, confidentiality, or conflict of in-
terest. The Commission's short answer to Foley, Hoag's contention 
was that the state labor act37 does not provide a discretionary basis for 
declining jurisdiction.38 In addition, the Commission examined the 
30!d. at 1306-07. The Commission compared the concluding sentence in Bodle, Fogel, 
"[Ilt is our present determination that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated 
by our assertion of jurisdiction over law firms," with the Board's language in Evans & 
Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1216,79 L.R.R.M. 1181, 1182 (1972), "Our decision 
herein is limited solely to the facts of the instant case and not to law firms as a class." 2 
M.L.C. at 1307 n.9. 
31 2 M.L.C. at 1307. 
3 2 Id. 
33Id. 
3. G.L. c. 150A, § I, provides in part: "The denial by employers of the right of em-
ployees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective 
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the 
intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing industry and trade .... " 
3. 2 M.L.C. at 1309. 
36Id. 
37 G.L. c. 150A. 
38 2 M.L.C. at 1313. 
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question of whether despite issues of confidentiality or conflict of in-
terest there could exist an appropriate bargaining unit. Citing Board 
precedent, the Commission concluded that membership by employees 
in a labor organization does not result in a sufficient conflict of in-
terest to warrant denying those employees their fundamental bargain-
ing rights. 39 As to issues of confidentiality, the Commission concluded 
that that problem was best raised at a hearing to determine the ap-
propriat ' bargaining unit. 40 
Foley, Hoag was a private sector case involving a large group of un-
organized, clerical employees who would seem to have been subject to 
the Board's jurisdiction, but who, for special reasons, had been 
excluded by the Board. Such a vacuum is not dissimilar to the situa-
tion in the health care industry ten years ago when the Board, by 
statute, was denied jurisdiction over that industry. Because of the fed-
eral statutory limitation, there was a tremendous increase of state 
labor agency involvement in the health care industry, which resulted 
in the passage of the 1974 amendments to the National Labor Re-
lations Act, granting the Board jurisdiction in the area.41 If the Board 
refuses jurisdiction and states begin granting organizational rights to 
employees of law firms, the reaction of the legal profession, not with-
out its own legislative power, will be interesting to watch. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS 
In another significant departure from a recent Board decision, the 
Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission granted certification to a 
unit composed of residents, interns, and clinical fellows at a municipal 
hospital. Both the Board's and the Commission's decisions initially fo-
cused on the issue of whether residents, interns, and clinical fellows 
("housestaff') were students or employees. If employees, then both 
conceded that certification would be appropriate, but if students, then 
neither the state nor the federal labor relations acts granted coverage. 
In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center,42 the Board found the housestaff to 
be students rather than employees within the meaning of that term in 
the National Labor Relations Act. 43 The Board's decision was based 
on its determination that the housestaff was "primarily engaged in 
graduate educational training at Cedars-Sinai and that . . . [w ]hile the 
house staff spends a great percentage of their time in direct patient 
39 [d. at 1314. 
40 [d. Although the Commission accepted preliminary jurisdiction over Foley, Hoag, it 
continued its hearings while the union requested an appeal and was granted an applica-
tion for formal argument before the Board. The continuance was permitted since a 
finding of jurisdiction by the Board would preempt the Commission's jurisdiction. 
41 Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. 
42 223 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 91 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1976). For a discussion of Cedars-Sinai, see 
Annual Survey of Labor Law, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1105 (1976). 
43 223 N.L.R.B. at ,91 L.R.R.M. at 1400. 
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care, this is simply the means by which the learning process is carried 
out."44 In addition, the Board found that staffing at Cedars-Sinai was 
done not so much to meet hospital needs, but rather was done to pro-
vide educational benefits to the housestaff, and that interns and resi-
dents chose hospitals for their educational advantages, rather than for 
their respective rates of pay.45 In a strong dissenting opinion,46 Board 
Member Fanning found that employee and student status were not 
mutually exclusive and proceeded to analyze the employment charac-
teristics of the housestaff, including salaries of up to $20,000.00 per 
annum, tax withholding, vacations, uniforms, health insurance, and 
other fringe benefits.47 
In City of Cambridge and Cambridge Hospital House Officers 
Association,48 the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission closely 
followed the Fanning dissent in Cedars-Sinai. While the Commission 
recognized the educational benefits accruing to interns and residents, 
it "reject[ed] the Board's conclusion that the professional development 
received by house officers precludes an employment relationship be-
tween the hospital and these providers of essential health care."49 In 
reaching its decision, the Commission considered many of the same 
factors as Member Fanning.50 Additionally, the Commission found 
support in the decisions of the New York and Michigan Labor Rela-
tions Commission, which ruled that housestaffs of municipal hospitals 
were covered under the applicable state public employee labor rela-
tions act.51 
In Cambridge City Hospital, the Commission categorized the factors to 
be considered in coming to a decision with respect to the status of a 
housestaff as those imposed by external sources and those imposed by 
the employer itself. The Commission found that the housestaff at 
Cambridge City Hospital was subject to income tax and eligible for 
Workmen's Compensation-external factors-and received fringe ben-
efits, ID cards and a competitive salary-internal factors.52 The 
Commission also looked at the working conditions at the hospital, not-
ing that while requests for rotational assignments were normally made 
by the housestaff, the final decision in placement was predicated on 
hospital staffing needs and not on personal career goals as expressed 
HId. at ,91 L.R.R.M. at 1400. 
45Id. at ,91 L.R.R.M. at 1400. 
4"Id. at ,91 L.R.R.M. at 1401-06. 
47Id. at ,91 L.R.R.M. at 1402-04. 
48 2 M.L.C. 1450. 
49Id. at 1459. 
50Id. at 1459-60. The factors considered included, inter alia, the pay schedule, the 
coverage of the housestaff by Workmen's Compensation, and Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield, and the receipt of paid vacation. 
51 Regents v. Michigan University, 204 N.W.2d 218, 82 L.R.R.M. 2909 (Mich. 1973); 
Bronx Eye Infirmary, Inc., 32 N.L.R.B. 65 (N.Y. 1969). 
52 2 M.L.C. at 1461-63. 
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through requests. 53 In sum, the Commission, without rejecting the 
existence and importance of the educational aspects of internships 
and residencies, found that the fundamental relationship between a 
hospital and an intern or resident was one of employment, and that 
"[t]he fact that house officers may be students for some purposes and 
employees of others ... should not deprive them of all rights under 
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 150E."54 
Cambridge City Hospital was a public sector case involving highly 
skilled and educated professionals. The case manifests the willingness 
of the Commission to take jurisdiction and grant organizational rights 
to groups of persons disenfranchised by the Board's jurisdictional lim-
itations. In Cambridge City Hospital, the employees involved would not 
have been subject to the national act as they were municipal em-
ployees. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the different positions 
taken in Cedars Sinai and Cambridge City Hospital by the Board and the 
Commission respectively on the student /employee issue. The 
Commission, unlike the Board, seems willing to separate for the pur-
poses of granting bargaining rights the employee aspect of the house-
staffs position from the student aspect. As a result, the Commission 
seems in a better position to confront a difficult factual situation and 
arrive at a result that furthers the policy underlying collective bargain-
ing acts. 
III. DUTY TO BARGAIN 
In IAFF Local 1009 v. City of Worcester, 55 the Labor Relations Com-
mission concerned itself with the duty to bargain where the parties 
had entered into factfinding pursuant to section 9 of chapter 150E of 
the General Laws.56 The Commission addressed the question of 
53 [d. at 1463. 
54 [d. The Commission also rejected the employer's contention that members of the 
housestaff were part-time employees. [d. at 1464-65. 
552 M.L.C. 1238 (1975). 
56 Section 9 provides the procedures for mediation, factfinding, and voluntary arbi-
tration in the public sector. The proceedings for factfinding and voluntary arbitration 
are as follows: 
If the impasse continues after the conclusion of mediation, either party or the 
parties acting jointly may petition the board to initiate fact-finding proceedings. 
Upon receipt of such petition, the board shall appoint a fact-finder, representative 
of the public, from a list of qualified persons maintained by the board. In the al-
ternative, the parties may agree upon a person to serve as fact-finder and shall 
notify the board of such agreement and choice of fact-finder. No person shall be 
named as a fact-finder who has represented an employer or employee organization 
within the preceding twelve months. The fact-finder shall be subject to the rules of 
the board and shall, in addition to powers delegated to him by the board, have the 
power to mediate and to make recommendations for the resolution of the impasse. 
The fact-finder shall transmit his findings and any recommendations for the res-
olution of the impasse to the board and to both parties within thirty days after the 
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whether submission of issues involving nonmandatory subjects of bar-
gaining to a section 9 factfinder was consistent with good faith 
bargaining.57 In addition, the Commission examined whether the 
shifting of a party's demands during factfinding constituted bad faith 
participation in the factfinding process.58 
In City of Worcester, the firefighters union, after submitting evi-
dence to the factfinder, provided him with forty issues for resolution. 
The City objected to all but eight of these proposals as being non-
mandatory and alleged that the union's submission constituted a fail-
ure to bargain in good faith. 59 The Commission rejected the City's 
contention, concluding that while the City had objected to the submis-
sion, it had done so only after the submission and completion of the 
parties' presentations.60 The Commission ruled that this failure to 
make timely objection was fatal. 61 In its view, a party does not waive 
objection when it discusses the nonmandatory subject in the initial 
bargaining phase. In fact, the Commission appears to encourage such 
discussion. 62 The Commission reasoned, however, that the ameliora-
tory effect of open discussion was no longer applicable once the par-
ties have invoked impasse procedures. In this context, the Commission 
stated: 
On the contrary, a requirement that an employer timely object to 
consideration by the fact finder of nonmandatory subjects at least 
date of his appointment. If the impasse remains unresolved ten days after the 
transmittal of such findings and recommendations, the board shall make them 
public. 
Any arbitration award in a proceeding voluntarily agreed to by the parties to re-
solve an impasse shall be binding on the parties and on the appropriate legislative 
body and made effective and enforceable pursuant to the provisions of chapter 
one hundred and fifty C, provided that said arbitration proceeding has been au-
thorized by the appropriate legislative body or in the case of school employees, by 
the approriate school committee. 
If the impasse continues after the publication of the fact-finder's report, the is-
sues in dispute shall be returned to the parties for further bargaining. 
Any time limitations prescribed in this section may be extended by mutual 
agreement of the parties and the board. 
51 G.L. c. 150E, §§ 1O(b)(I)-(2), mandate good faith bargaining. Subsections (1) and 
(2) provide: 
(b) It shall be a prohibited practice for an employee organization or its desig-
nated agent to: 
(1) Interfere, restrain, or coerce any employer or employee in the exercise of 
any right guaranteed under this chapter; 
(2) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the public employer, if it is 
an exclusive representative, as required in section six; ... 
58 [d. § 1O(b)(3), provides that it is a prohibited practice for an employer organization 
to: "(3) Refuse to participate in good faith in the mediation, fact finding and arbitration 
procedures set forth in sections eight and nine." 
59 2 M.L.C. at 1238. 
60 [d. at 1240. 
6'See id. at 1240-41. 
62 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Davidson, 318 F.2d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 1963). 
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serves the salutory purpose of alerting the employee organization 
that submission of the challenged proposals may trigger the filing 
of a complaint of prohibited practice, thereby enabling the em-
ployee organization to consider withdrawal of the questioned issues 
in order to avert the risk of a prohibited practice, with the 
consequence-for police and fire-of delaying compulsory in-
terest arbitration.63 
In this manner the Commission decided that the tardy objection con-
stituted the waiver although it also found that insistence, over timely 
objection, to a nonmandatory subject, would be a violation of the 
good faith requirement if the bargaining involved police officers or 
firefighters. 64 
Though not deciding the question, the Commission suggested that 
when the bargaining does not involve police officers or firefighters 
and therefore does not involve an ultimate, mandatory impasse set-
tleinent mechanism, submission to the factfinder, over timely objec-
tion, of a nonmandatory subject may not constitute bad faith bargain-
ing. The Commission's distinction was predicated on its belief that the 
voluntary arbitration mechanism of section 9 was rarely used and thus 
non police or fire factfinding "typically serves merely as a prelude to 
further bargaining, has little or no 'precedential' value and therefore 
[there is] significantly less reason [for such fact finding to be] limited 
in scope."65 
Such a distinction is logical since little harm is done in nonfinal 
situations by encouraging wide-ranging and generally more open 
negotiations. However, where the effect of allowing submission of 
nonmandatory subjects may be to permit an outside arbitrator to im-
pose a settlement which includes matters otherwise nonmandatory, 
one of the parties may be prejudiced by permitting the submission of 
such a nonmandatory subject to the arbitrator. 
In City of Worcester, the City also alleged union violations of the duty 
to bargain in good faith arising from the union's shifting of its de-
mands during the factfinding stage. The Commission, however, re-
jected this contention.66 The Commission noted that factfinding serves 
a mediatory function as well as the quasi-adjudicative one. Accord-
ingly, it concluded that since the process of factfinding is part of the 
continuum of collective bargaining, those steps which further the pro-
cess can hardly be held to be bargaining in bad faith. 67 Examining the 
facts before it, the Commission concluded that since there was no evi-
dence of an agreement on the demands which were modified, nor 
63 2 M.L.C. at 1240. Section 4 of chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973 provides for com-
pulsory interest arbitration for police and firefighters' unions. For a discussion of those 
procedures. see §6.7 supra. 
64 2 M.L.C. at 1244. 
6. Id. 
66Id. at 1245. 
67 See id. at 1246. 
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were these shifts evidenced by any actual motive to harass the city, the 
modification of these demands, as submitted to the factfinder, was not 
an indication of bad faith bargaining.68 
IV. USE OF AN EXPEDITED HEARING 
In an attempt to aid it in meeting an increasing workload, the 
Commission approved a number of procedural matters in Town if 
Sharon v. joseph B. Puchalski. 69 In Puchalski the Commission, in affirm-
ing an earlier decision in which an improper practice had been found, 
underscored its position on the propriety of ordering a section 11 70 
expedited hearing over the objection of both parties. 71 It rendered its 
decision on the basis of the hearing officer's handwritten notes (used 
solely to verify the accuracy of the tapes and not for the purposes of 
making an official record), and the tape recordings made at the hear-
ing. The town had objected to the procedure on due process grounds, 
alleging numerous gaps and inadequacies in the recordings. 72 The 
Commission did not deny the existence of certain minor gaps, but 
found them to be insufficient, when examined and compared with the 
hearing officer's notes, to prevent the Commission from fairly ap-
praising and deciding the case. 73 
68 [d. at 1245. The Commission also rejected the city's contention that the union had 
violated the ground rules by giving information to a newspaper reporter. [d. at 
1246-47. Moreover, the Commission rejected the contention of bad faith predicated 
upon certain minor errors in calculations pertaining to matters presented to the fact-
finder by the union. [d. at 1247-50. 
69 3 M.L.C. 1052 (1976). 
70 G.L. c. 150E, § II, provides in part: 
Upon any complaint made under this section the commission in its discretion 
may order that the hearing be conducted by a member or agent of the commis-
sion. At such hearing the employer, the employee organization or the person so 
complained of shall have the right to appear in person or otherwise defend against 
such complaint. At the discretion of the commission, any person may be allowed to 
intervene in such proceeding. In any hearing the member or agent shall not be 
bound by the technical rules of evidence prevailing in the courts. At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the member or agent shall determine whether a practice prohibited 
under section ten has been committed and if so, he shall issue an order requiring 
it or him to cease and desist from such prohibited practice. If the member or 
agent determines that a practice prohibited under section ten has not been com-
mitted, he shall issue an order dismissing the complaint. Any order issued pur-
suant to this paragraph shall become final and binding unless, within ten days 
after notice thereof, any party requests a review by the full commission. A review 
may be made upon a written statement of the case by the member or agent agreed 
to by the parties, or upon written statements furnished by the parties, or, if any 
party or the commission requests, upon a transcript of the testimony taken at the 
preliminary hearing, together with such other testimony as the commission may 
require. 
71 3 M.L.C. at 1052 n.!. 
72 [d. at 1055, 1057-58. 
73/d. at 1059. 
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V. AGENCY FEE REGULATIONS 
Pursuant to section 9R of chapter 23 of the General Laws,74 the 
Commission in June of 1976 adopted new agency service fee rules. 
These rules implement section 12 of chapter 150E, which section 
permits the imposition of a service fee on public employees rep-
resented by a bargaining agent where the contract so providing has 
been duly ratified. 
In adopting a comprehensive set of rules and regulations, the 
Commission was able to avoid the necessity of litigation on each as-
pect, could expedite individual problems, and establish a uniform set 
of standards. The fee was carefully limited to that amount actually 
expended by the bargaining agent in the course of collective bargain-
ing contract administration. 75 The rules also set forth due process 
protection for the ratification of the contract imposing the service 
fee 76 and requirements regarding termination for nonpayment.77 This 
use of rulemaking powers to implement the public employee collective 
bargaining act was a further extension of the procedures adopted for 
74 G.L. c. 23 § 9R, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 2A. Section 9R provides in 
part: "The commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend and re-
scind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of ... 
chafter one hundred and fifty E," 
7 Rules and Regulations Relating to the Administration of an Act providing for Col-
lective Bargaining for Public Employees, Article IX, § 3. In § 3(b) the Commission pro-
vided that "[t]he service fee shall be proportionately commensurate with the costs of col-
lective bargaining and contract administration." In addition, the Commission sought to 
delimit what constituted collective bargaining costs by setting out in its regulations cer-
tain activities deemed not to be related to collective bargaining and contract administra-
tion. The activities so listed include: 
i. Contributions to political parties or candidates for or holders of public office; 
ii. Contributions to charitable, religious or political organizations or causes; 
iii. Fines, penalties or damages arising from the unlawful activities of a bargaining 
agent or a bargaining agent's officers or agents or members; 
iv. Costs of social or recreational activities; 
v. Costs of educational activities unrelated to collective bargaining and contract 
administration; 
vi. Costs of medical insurance, retirement benefits or other benefit programs; 
vii. Costs incurred by the bargaining agent to organize employees who are not in-
cluded in the bargaining unit; 
viii. Other costs unrelated to collective bargaining and contract administration. 
[d. at § 3(d). 
76 [d. at § 4. Section 4 provides for ratification by a majority of all the employers on a 
bargaining unit present and voting regardless of their status with the union. [d. at § 
4(a)-(c). Section 4 further delineates the notice requirements that must be met prior to 
the convening of a ratification meeting. [d. at 4(d)-(f). 
77 [d. at § 5. Section 5 provides that an employee need only tender payment of the 
fee to insulate himself from nonpayment termination. [d. at § 5(a). Moreover, the pay-
ment of the fee cannot be required, "before the thirtieth day following the beginning of 
the employee's employment or the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, 
whichever is later." [d. In addition, § 5(b) gives an employee the right to challenge his 
or her nonpayment termination through the collectively bargained for grievance proce-
dure and/or through a charge with the Commission. The aggrieved employee can also 
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unit determinations in 1975, when the Commission established the 
outline for the statewide units of state government employees by 
adopting a structure of ten basic units.78 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§6.10. Labor Law-Public Employee Impass,e Procedures-Final 
Offer Arbitration: Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration 1 (and a companion caseyz. The creation in Mas-
sachusetts of public employee collective bargaining rights is a fairly re-
cent development, and the status of the laws providing such rights 
remains unsettled. Although as early as 1958 the General Court 
granted to employees of the Commonwealth and its political sub-
divisions the right to form unions and present proposals with respect 
to salaries and other conditions of employment,3 prior to 1965 public 
employees were still dependent upon legislation for increases in wages 
and benefits.4 In 1965, the General Court enacted a comprehensive 
mandatory collective bargaining law for public employees. 5 The 1965 
statute denied municipal employees the right to engage in, induce, or 
encourage any strike, work stoppage, slowdown, or withholding of 
services.6 It replaced this traditional private sector bargaining weapon 
with a procedure for mediation, conciliation, and factfinding7 to en-
courage peaceful resolution of negotiations. However, it contained no 
effective substitute for the strike to produce an agreement if both par-
ties remained set in their positions after mediation and factfinding. 
Because the statute lacked the element of finality produced by a 
strike, it was criticized by public employees as not providing meaning-
ful collective bargaining rights. 8 
continue his or her employment if the contested service fee is paid into an escrow fund 
administered by the bargaining agent or otherwise made appropriately available to the 
agent. /d. at § 5(b). 
78 See Amendment to Rules and Regulations of the Labor Relations Commission, 1 
M.L.R.R. 3031. 
§6.10. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2035, 352 N.E.2d 914. Other defendants are rep-
resentatives of the members of Local 1297, International Association of Firefighters, 
AFL-CIO. [d. 2035 n.l, 352 N.E.2d at 914 n.1. 
2 A companion case, Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, was de-
cided at the same time. The other defendant was Arthur Cuarente, individually and as 
representative of the members of the Arlington Ranking Officers Association. [d. at 
2035 n.2, 352 N.E.2d at 914 n.2. 
3 Acts of 1958, c. 460. 
4 See Segal, Labor Law: Municipal Bargaining, 1971 ANN. SURV. MASS, LAW § 6.2, at 99. 
5 Acts of 1965, c. 763. This statute applied to all county, city, town or district 
employees, except elected officers, board and commission members, executive officers, 
and police. [d. at c. 763, § 2, amending C.L. c. 149l7y inserting § 178C. 
6 [d. at c. 763, § 2, amending C.L. c. 149l7y inserting § 178M. 
7 [d. at c. 763, § 2, amending C.L. c. 149l7y inserting § 178J. 
8 See Sherry, Labor Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 2.12, at 25. 
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Chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973, inserted as chapter 150E of the 
General Laws,9 moved toward providing these meaningful bargaining 
rights in the area of protective services. While the new law continues 
to prohibit strikes in all areas of public employment,10 it provides for 
the submission of unresolved bargaining issues to final and binding 
arbitration for an experimental three-year period in the area of 
municipal and town firefighters and police officers.u 
This comment will describe the general impasse procedures im-
plemented by section nine of chapter 150E for public employees and 
the specific compulsory arbitration provisions of section four which 
affect police and fire personnel. It will then discuss the constitutional 
challenges leveled against these compulsory arbitration provisions by 
cities and towns of the Commonwealth in the Town of Arlington case. 
Upon determining that the Court properly dismissed the challenges 
under the Massachusetts Constitution and General Laws, the comment 
will examine the underlying policy considerations which support the 
use of compulsory interest arbitration for an additional experimental 
period within the area of protective services. After an analysis of the 
alternatives to arbitration that would produce the necessary "finality" 
in collective bargaining impasse situations, it will be concluded that 
compulsory arbitration is the only viable alternative which properly 
balances the need of public employees for meaningful collective bar-
gaining, the need of the community for uninterrupted police and fire 
service, and the need of municipalities to control the cost and effi-
ciency of such services. 
Impasse procedures under section 9 of chapter 150E 12 affect all 
public employees covered by the new law. 13 Section 9 provides that 
after a reasonable period of negotiation over the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement, either party, or the parties acting jointly, may 
petition the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for a determination 
that an impasse exists. Upon determining that such impasse exists, the 
Board is empowered to appoint a mediator to assist the parties in the 
resolution of the impasse.14 Within twenty days of his appointment, 
9 Acts of 1973, c. 1078 (codified at G.L. c. 150E, § 1 et. seq.). Police are included for 
the first time within the definition of employee. /d. at § 1. 
10 G.L. c. 150E, § 9A. 
11 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, §§ 4, 8. 
12 G.L. c. 150E, § 9. 
13 Under G.L. c. 150E, § 1, "public employee" is defined as: 
any person employed by a public employer except elected officials, appointed offi-
cials, members of any board or commission, representatives of any public em-
ployer, including the heads, directors and executive and administrative officers of 
departments and agencies of any public employer, and other managerial 
employees or confidential employees, and members of the militia or national guard 
and employees of the commission .... 
14 C.L. c. 150E, § 9. The parties are also free to agree between themselves upon a 
person to serve as mediator, provided they notify the Board of their agreement and 
choice. [d. 
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the mediator must issue to the Board a report indicating the results of 
his services in resolving the impasse. If the impasse continues, either 
party, or the parties acting jointly, may petition the Board to appoint a 
factfinder. 15 The factfinder is subject to the rules of the Board and 
has the power to mediate and make recommendations for the resolu-
tion of the impasse. He is required to transmit his findings and any 
recommendations for the resolution of the impasse to the Board and 
to both parties within thirty days of his appointment. 16 If the impasse 
remains unresolved ten days after the transmittal of such findings and 
recommendations, the Board is required to make public the find-
ings. 17 
Although the parties may voluntarily agree to resolve an impasse by 
arbitration, in which case the arbitration award is binding on the par-
ties and upon the appropriate legislative body,18 they are in no way 
forced to do so, and neither party may do so unilaterally. If the im-
passe continues beyond the publication of the factfinder's report, the 
issues in dispute are returned to the parties for further bargaining. 19 
In all areas of public employment except police and fire personnel, 
the statutory aids provided to resolve collective bargaining disputes 
are exhausted at this point. Because public employees are denied the 
right to strike to test the strength of their bargaining position, and be-
cause public employers are unlikely to submit voluntarily to a form of 
third party arbitration, the procedure fails to define a point at which a 
final and mutual decision must be made if the parties remain set in 
their positions after mediation and factfinding. Without the element 
of finality produced by the strike or a form of third party arbitration, 
meaningful collective bargaining is frustrated and at times appears il-
lusory. Additional bargaining is futile when there is little incentive to 
reach an agreement. 20 
151d. The Board is required to appoint a fact-finder representative of the public from 
a list of qualified persons it maintains. The parties may also agree between themselves 
upon a person to serve as factfinder and must notify the Board of such agreement and 
choice of factfinder.ld. 
16ld. 
17 ld. The purpose of making the factfinder's report public is to bring public pressure 
to bear on the parties, and to encourage them to settle according to me factfinder's rec-
ommendations. "Pickets at City HaU"-Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth Century 
Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment, GOVT EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 
RF-l, 51:151 (1970). 
18 Provided that the arbitration proceeding has been authorized by the appropriate 
legislative body. G.L. c. 150E, §9. 
19 See id. 
20 It is important to note mat the 1973 statute leaves public employees without a 
stat~tory resolution of their impasse beyond mediation and factfinding only in the area 
of collective bargaining agreements. G.L. c. 150E, §8, provides that me parties may include 
wimin a written agreement a grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbi-
tration in disputes concerning the interpretation and application of such written 
agreements. In the absence of such a grievance procedure, binding arbitration may be or-
dered by the Labor Relations Commission upon the request of either party. See Grie.vance 
Arbitration in the Public Sector.' The New Massachusetts Law, 9 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 721 
(1975), for a discussion of the binding arbitration of grievance procedures. 
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Section 4 of chapter 150E attempts to remedy this situation with re-
spect to employees engaged in protective municipal services. 
When an employee organization representing the fire fighters or 
police officers of a city, town, or district is engaged in an impasse that 
has continued for thirty days after publication of the factfinder's re-
port, section 4 of chapter 150E provides that the employee organiza-
tion shall petition the Board to make an investigation.21 If the Board 
determines that the section 9 requirements22 have been complied with 
in good faith by the employee organization, that proceedings for the 
prevention of any prohibited practices have been exhausted,23 and 
that an impasse exists, the Board is required to notify the parties im-
mediately that the issues in dispute will be resolved by arbitration.24 
The arbitration proceedings will be conducted by a panel selected in 
accordance with the provisions of section 4 of chapter 150E.25 Pur-
suant to section 4 the proceedings before the arbitration panel are in-
formal. Consequently, "any oral or documentary evidence and other 
data deemed relevant by the arbitration panel may be received into 
evidence."26 Also, any person, labor organization, or governmental 
unit having substantial interest in the proceedings may be granted 
leave to intervene.27 At the conclusion of the hearing, each party must 
21 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4. Section 8 of chapter 1078 provides that "the provisions 
of section four of this act shall terminate on June thirtieth nineteen hundred and 
seventy-seven." 
22 See text at notes 10-15 supra. 
23 Such complaints must have been filed with the Labor Relations Commission prior 
to the date of the factfinder's report. See G.L. c. 150E, § 10, for list of prohibited prac-
tices. Section 11 defines the procedure under which a section 10 prohibited practice 
complaint is handled by the labor relations commission. The Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration discovered in 1975 that some prohibited practice charges which were wholly 
unrelated to bargaining were delaying final offer arbitration. In a joint memorandum 
issued by the Board and Labor Relations Commission on March 20, 1975, a policy was 
adopted under which the Board need not refrain from processing arbitration petitions, 
even where prohibited practice charges are pending before the Commission, where: 
(1) The charge is unrelated to the requirement to bargain in good faith or the re-
quirement to comply in good faith with mediation and factfinding procedures; (2) 
The charge is filed by an employee organization and alleges lack of good faith 
bargaining by the public employer, provided that disposition of the charge does not 
require a determination as to the scope of bargaining under chapter one hundred 
and fifty E. 
See: Interim Report of the Governor's Task Force on Chapter 150£ and Impasse Procedures, 
Pub. No. 9102-14-35-8-76-CR. 
24 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4. 
25 The arbitration panel consists of a member selected by the town, a member 
selected by the employee organization, and an impartial chairman chosen by the other 
two members from a list of arbitrators prepared by the Board. The Board, in an effort 
to enforce the section 4 time constraints on choosing neutral arbitrators, has since Janu-
ary of 1975 required that the parties strike no more than four names each on one list 
of nine. This procedure assures that one name must be acceptable to both. Interim Re-
port of the Governor's Task Force on Chapter 150£ and Impasse Procedures, Pub. No. 9102-
14-35-8-76-CR., at 5. 
26 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4. The arbitrators are given subpoena powers and the 
power to administer oaths. Id. 
27Id. The hearings must be concluded within forty days. Id. 
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submit to the panel a written statement containing its "last and best" 
offer for each of the issues in dispute. Within ten days thereafter, a 
majority of the panel must select one of the two written statements. 
The panel's selection will be final and binding upon the parties and 
upon the appropriate legislative body.28 If the arbitration panel's deci-
sion is supported by material and substantive evidence on the whole 
record, that decision may be equitably enforced by either party or the 
arbitration panel in the superior court.29 
The constitutional implications of the chapter 150E proceedings for 
final and binding arbitration for police officers and firefighters were 
tested during the Survey year in Town of Arlington v. Board of Concilia-
tion and Arbitration.30 In Town of Arlington, after separate negotiations 
between the town and employee organizations representing the 
firefighters and police officers failed to produce collective bargaining 
agreements, each employee organization petitioned the Board of Con-
ciliation and Arbitration for mediation and factfinding.31 When no 
contract emerged, the Board determined that the conditions for bind-
ing arbitration existed.32 Following the arbitration hearings, a majority 
of each panel selected the written statement submitted by the 
employee organizations.33 Thereafter, the town brought an action to 
set aside the "last and best offer" arbitration awards issued pursuant 
to section 4.34 The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate re-
28Id. The arbitration panel, in arriving at a decision, is directed to give weight to ten 
standards: 
(I)The financial ability of the municipality to meet costs. 
(2) The interests and welfare of the public. 
(3) The hazards of employment, physical, educational, and mental qualifications, 
job training and skills involved. 
(4) A comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employees 
involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours and conditions of 
employment of other employees performing similar services and with other 
employees generally in public and private employment in comparable com-
munities. 
(5) The decisions and recommendations of the factfinder. 
(6) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as the 
cost of living. 
(7) The overall compensation presendy received by the employees, including direct 
wages and fringe benefits. 
(8) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the ar-
bitration proceedings. 
(9) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or tradi-
tionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and condi-
tions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-
finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in 
private employment. 
(10) The stipulation of the parties. 
29Id. 
30 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2035, 352 N.E.2d 914. See note 1 supra. 
31 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2037, 352 N.E.2d at 917. 
32Id. 
33 Id. at 2038, 352 N .E.2d at 917. 
34 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2035, 352 N.E.2d at 916. The cities of Boston and Worces-
ter joined in the town's brief as amici curiae. Seventy-five municipalities of the Com-
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view on reservation and report by the superior court judge without 
decision. 35 On appeal, the town challenged the constitutionality of 
final and binding arbitration on four grounds. The town argued that 
such arbitration (I) violated the Home Rule Amendment to the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution by removing decision-making power with re-
gard to police and fire services from the municipality, (2) un-
constitutionally delegated legislative power to a panel of private in-
dividuals, (3) contravened the "one-man, one-vote" principle in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and (4) violated provisions of the 
municipal finance laws that had previously been held to prevail over 
conflicting statutes.36 
The Court dismissed each of these challenges. It found the arbitration 
provisions contained in section 437 to be (1) a general law consistent with 
the General Court's power under section 8 of the Home Rule Amend-
ment,38 (2) a proper occasion for delegation, given the protections against 
arbitrary action that section 4 of chapter 150E39 provided,40 (3) not a 
grant of general legislative power to the arbitration panel, and thus not 
involving the "one-man, one-vote" principle of the equal protection 
clause,41 and (4) a statute in which the General Court specifically provided 
that the funding of arbitration awards would prevail over conflicting 
municipal finance laws.42 The Court therefore held that the binding 
arbitration provisions of section 4 of chapter 150E suffered from no 
constitutional infirmity. 43 
An examination of each ground of decision in Town of Arlington 
serves to highlight the major constitutional issues involved in the area 
of public employee impasse procedures. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO BINDING ARBITRATION 
A. HOME RULE AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
The Town of Arlington first challenged the binding arbitration 
provisions of section 444 as violative of the Home Rule Amendment to 
the Massachusetts Constitution.45 The town acknowledged that prior 
monwealth endorsed the brief by authorization of boards of selectmen, mayors, or city 
councils. See Brief for Appellant at 58-9. 
35/d. at 2035, 352 N.E.2d at 916. Direct appellate review was granted pursuant to 
G.L. c. 213, § lB. 
36 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2036-37, 352 N.E.2d at 916. 
37 G.L. C. 150E, § 4. 
38 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2040-41,352 N.E.2d at 918. 
39 G.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
40 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2043-44,352 N.E.2d at 919. 
41/d. at 2046-47, 352 N.E.2d at 920. 
421d. at 2048, 352 N.E.2d at 921. 
431d. at 2052, 352 N.E.2d at 922. 
44 G.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
45 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039, 352 N.E.2d at 918. See MASS. CONST. amend. art. 
LXXXIX. 
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to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment,46 cities and towns 
were creatures of the state and subject to the absolute will of the legis-
latureY However, the town argued that adoption of the amendment, 
with its purpose being: 
... to grant and confirm to the people of every city and town the 
right of self-government in local matters, subject to the provisions 
of this article and to such standards and requirements as the gen-
eral court may establish by law in accordance with the provisions 
of this article48 
had the effect of granting plenary powers to cities and towns.49 As 
such, the municipalities were subject only to general regulation by the 
legislature, and prohibited only from exercising a limited number of 
functions. 50 The town then proceeded to argue that in light of the 
fact that the control of police and fire services are not included in the 
list of prohibited functions, and since such services are "core functions 
to the existence of local government,"51 municipalities could now in-
dependently control those services. The town contended that the 
Legislature's provision for binding arbitration at the request only of 
municipal fire and police employees, without the consent of the city or 
town, was contrary to the purpose of the Home Rule Amendment, in-
sofar as the provision potentially transferred the complete manage-
ment of police and fire services from municipal officials to arbitration 
panels.52 
The Court admitted that it was the intention of the Home Rule 
Amendment to grant to cities and towns "independent municipal 
46 Article 89 was adopted by the General Courts of the political years 1963 and 1965, 
and was approved by the people on November 8, 1966. MASS. CON ST. amend. art. 
LXXXIX. 
47 The Home Rule Procedures Act, G.L. c. 43B, passed by the General Court in the 
extra session of 1966, detailed the procedures under which the municipalities could ef-
fect this constitutional grant of home rule. Acts of 1966, Extra Session, c. 734. 
48 MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § I. 
49 Brief for Appellant at 9. 
50 [d. These functions did not specifically include regulation of police and fire service. 
MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 7, denies any city or town the power to: 
(I) regulate elections other than those prescribed by sections three and four; 
(2) to levy, assess and collect taxes; 
(3) to borrow money or pledge the credit of the city or town; 
(4) to dispose of park land; 
(5) to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships except as an incident to 
an exercise of an independent municipal power; or 
(6) to define and provide for the punishment of a felony or to impose imprison-
ment as a punishment for any violation of law; provided, however, that the forego-
ing enumerated powers may be granted by the general court in conformity with 
the constitution and with the powers reserved to the general court by section eight; 
nor shall the provisions of this article be deemed to diminish the powers of the ju-
dicial department of the Commonwealth. 
51 Brief for Appellant at 10 . 
• 2 [d. at 10-11. 
44
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/10
§6.10 LABOR LAW 201 
powers which they did not previously inherently possess."53 It noted, 
however, that section 6 of the amendment, while granting to 
municipalities broad governmental powers, limits the municipal exer-
cise of those powers to acts "not inconsistent with the constitution or 
laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved 
to the general court by section eight [of the amendment]."54 Those 
powers reserved to the Legislature by section 8 include the power "to 
act in relation to cities and towns, but only by general laws which 
apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to 
a class of not fewer than two .... "55 Since the binding arbitration 
provisions of section 456 applied equally to all employee organizations 
representing the firefighters or police officers in any city, town, or dis-
trict,57 the Court concluded that those provisions clearly fell within 
the scope of "general laws" as defined by section 8 of the Home Rule 
Amendment.58 In addition, the Court noted that the General Court's 
power to legislate in the area of municipal wages and benefits prior to 
the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment was well settled. 59 It 
found nothing in the amendment to withdraw or limit that power, 
other than the limits imposed by section 8, which limits the Legisla-
ture had not exceeded. 60 
In addition to its argument that the Home Rule Amendment 
guaranteed to municipalities independent control of police and fire 
services, the town presented another argument in support of its Home 
Rule Amendment challenge. After pointing out that section 7 of chap-
ter 150E61 specifies that the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment should prevail over conflicting municipal personnel ordinances, 
the town asserted that this provision conflicted with section 6 of the 
Home Rule Amendment in that section 6 subjects municipal ordi-
nances only to the Constitution and the General Laws and not to any 
contract determined by an arbitration panel.62 Thus, the town rea-
soned that a town by-law granting firefighters four weeks of vacation 
after twelve years of service should supersede the arbitrator's award of 
four weeks of vacation after ten years of service, because the town 
by-law neither conflicted with any General Law nor with any pro-
vision of the Constitution.63 
The Court dismissed this argument summarily, noting that in cases 
53 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039, 352 N.E.2d at 9IS, citing Board of Appeals of 
Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 35S, 294 N.E.2d 393, 40S (1973). 
54 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2040, 352 N.E.2d at 9IS, citing MASS. CON ST. amend. art. 
LXXXIX, § 6. 
55 MASS. CON ST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § S. 
56 G.L. C. I50E, § 4. 
57 Acts of 1973, c. 107S, § 4. 
58 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2041, 352 N.E.2d at 9IS. 
59 [d., citing Quinlan v. Cambridge, 320 Mass. 124, 126, 6S N.E.2d II, 14 (1946). 
60 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2041,352 N.E.2d at 9IS. 
61 G.L. c. I50E, § 7. 
62 Brief for Appellant at 13. 
63 [d. 
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of inconsistency or conflict, a local ordinance or by-law must give way 
to a law enacted by the legislature in accordance with section 8 of the 
Home Rule Amendment.64 The arbitration panel's laward, made pur-
suant to a valid general law, thus superseded the m~nicipal ordinance, 
both because it was enacted in accordance with section 8 of the Home 
Rule Amendment, and because such a result was mandated by section 
7 of chapter 150E.65 
i 
B. IMPROPER DELEGATION CHALLENGE I 
I 
Relying on article 5 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,66 
the town next challenged section 4 of chapter 150E67 as involving an 
unconstitutional delegation of power to a panel of politically un-
accountable private individuals.68 Article 5 states th~t since power de-
rives from and resides in the people, government! officers, whether 
executing legislative, executive, or judicial power, 'are agents of the 
people and are at all times accountable to the people.69 The town 
urged that the section 470 arbitration panel exercised two of the most 
fundamental legislative functions-the allocation of public. resources 
through the mechanism of the municipal budget, ~nd the legislative 
power of taxation. 71 The town asserted that munic~pal budgetmaking 
was a legislative function insofar as it traditionally involved a political 
bargaining process between competing interest groups,72 with the 
town budget representing an accommodation of those interests. 73 
64 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2041-42, 352 N.E.2d at 918, citinJ Board of Appeals of 
Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973) (order of 
state Housing Appeals Committee under G.L. c. 40B, §§20, 21 to permit building of low 
and moderate income housing was enforced in face of inconsistent local zoning by-
law); and Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 ~1973) ("Although sub-
stantiallegislative authority devolves upon local governments aut matically on the adop-
tion of such a self-executing home rule amendment, the Legisl ture by positive enact-
ments may restrict local legislative action or deny municipalitie power to act at all· in 
certain areas." ld. at 143-44 n.4, 293 N.E.2d at 273 n.4.) 
65 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2041-42, 352 N.E.2d at 918. G.L. c. 150E, § 7, provides 
in part: 
If a collective bargaining agreement reached by the emPloYJr and the exclusive 
representative contains a conflict between matters which are within the scope of 
negotiations pursuant to section six of this chapter and any unicipal, personnel 
ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation, ... the terms of the ollective bargaining 
agreement shall prevail. 
66 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 5. 
67 G.L. C. 150E, § 4. 
68 Brief for Appellant, 13-37. t 
69 "[All] power residing orginally in the people, and being d rived from them, the 
several magistrates and officers of government, vested with aut ority, whether legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents and ar at all times accounta-
ble to them." MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 5. 
70 G.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
71 Brief for Appellant, 13-15. 
7'ld. at 14, citing Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A POlitifal Perspective, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1156, 1162 (1974) [hereinafter, Summers]. 
7'ld., citing Summers, supra note 72, at 1162-63. ! 
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Such an accommodation, the town argued, should only be made by an 
individual politically responsible to those competing interest groupS.74 
However, under the challenged statute, an arbitration panel uni-
laterally exercising control over wages, hours, and conditions of 
employment, performs the municipal budgetmaking function in-
sulated from political accountability. 75 The town further asserted that 
an arbitration award involved the legislative power of taxation in that 
such an award not only affects the allocation of resources but also ul-
timately affects the municipal tax rate. 76 In this context, the town rea-
soned that since the budget is primarily comprised of salaries,77 and 
primarily funded by local property taxes,78 an arbitration award is in-
evitably linked to the local tax rate. 79 Accordingly, the town urged the 
Court to "look to the reality of how power is exercised by the arbitra-
tion panel,"80 and the effect of that power on the local legislative body 
which is unable to "review, reject or amend a panel selection."81 
With respect to the issue of the "reality of how power is exercised," 
the town argued the panel was not politically accountable not-
withstanding the inclusion in section 4 of the ten standards designed 
to guide the arbitration panel's decision.82 The town viewed these 
standards as too subjective,83 and criticized the statute as lacking any 
indication of the weight to be accorded the factors when they pointed 
in opposite directions.84 Further buttressing its improper delegation 
theory, the town asserted that the ad-hoc operational framework of 
the arbitration panel insulates the arbitrators from public accountabil-
ity,85 that judicial review is not a substitute for political re-
74 [d. at IS, citing Summers, supra note 72, at 1184. 
"See Brief for Appellant at 17-18. 
76 [d. at 16-17. 
77 Ninety-four percent of the monies appropriated for Arlington'S fire services in fis-
cal 1976 were for salaries. Brief for Appellant at 16. 
78 Approximately seventy-five percent of all the Town's budget appropriations are 
raised by property taxation. Brief for Appellant, appendix at 16. 
79 Brief for Appellant at 16. 
80 [d. at 22. 
81 [d. at 23. 
82ld. at 23. See note 28 supra for the ten standards. The Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration contended that the "language, purposes, and statutory framework of Sec-
tion 4 provide sufficient guidelines and safeguards to protect against arbitrariness." 
Brief for Appellee, Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 30-32. See also Brief for Ap-
pellee Local 1297, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, and Arlington 
Ranking Officers Association and their Representatives, 21-30. 
83 See Brief for Appellant at 23-28. For example, factor (2) in section 4's standards, 
"the interest and welfare of the public," cannot be ascertained by objective data, and in-
vites the arbitrator to make a judgment about what he thinks is good for the public. 
84 Compare, e.g., factor I, the financial ability of the municipality to meet costs, with 
factor five, the cost of living. G.L. c. 150E, § 4. Because there is no "universally ac-
cepted objective criteria" for determining public sector wage and benefit levels, arbi-
trators are left to rely on equitable considerations in place of economic objectivity, 
which can result in the social and economic philosophy of the arbitrator being imposed 
on the parties aIld the public. Brief for Appellant at 24-25. 
85 [d. at 28. Since authority to appoint the arbitration panel is dispersed, the town ar-
gued that no focus was provided for political accountability. Since the panel was not a 
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sponsibility,86 and that the operational procedures hf the arbitration 
panel do not protect against the arbitrary exercise of power.87 
In response to the town's improper delegation chjllenge, the Court 
indicated that the doctrine of nondelegation does nJt stem from arti-
cle 5 of the Declaration of Rights, as the town had asserted, but from 
article 30 of the Declaration of Rights88 and from article 4 of section 1 
of chapter 1 of part 2 of the Massachusetts Constitufion.89 The Court 
recognized that the Legislature was unable to deleg1te general power 
to make laws.90 It carefully distinguished, however, the improper del-
egation of lawmaking responsibility from the Legislature's proper del-
egation to a board of the responsibility to implemeqt the details of a 
previously established legislative policy.91 The CoJrt acknowledged 
that central to the delegation question was the issue of whether the 
General Court had provided protection against arbitlary action by the 
arbitration panel. 92 In this context, the Court found hat the ten stan-
dards contained in section 4,93 plus the regulatio s governing the 
hearings procedure and conduct, the requirement that arbitration be 
preceded by negotiation, mediation, and factfindin~, and the provi-
sion for judicial review by either party in the superior court, provided 
adequate protection against arbitrary action.94 Moreover, while the 
Court agreed that the arbitration panel had the power to establish 
salaries,95 it found this power to be entirely distinct fr~m the powers of 
appropriation and taxation, which are exercised by tHe legislative body 
continuing body, it had no need to be responsive to the will of tht people to insure fu-
ture funding. The panel does not exercise continuing responsibil ty for administration 
of the power delegated to it, as would members of an administrat ve body. Concern for 
reputation does not render the arbitration responsive to the public. The selection pro-
cess does not render the panel politically accountable.ld. at 28-35. 
861d. at 35. The judicial review provision of C.L. c. I50E, § 4, ihdicates that the arbi-
tration panel's decision is binding on the parties and may be enforfed by either party or 
the arbitration panel in the superior court, provided that the panel's decision is sup-
ported by "material and substantive evidence on the whole record." Id. 
87 Brief for Appellant at 36. The arbitration panel's operation1;1 procedures are ex-
plained in the text at notes 21-25 supra. The town argued that t ere is no formal pro-
cedural decision making by the arbitration panel, and no indep ndent analysis of the 
evidentiary record. The neutral arbitrator decides the matter, with the other panel 
members presumptively voting for the offer of the party that apprinted them. Brief for 
Appellant at 36-37. 
88 MASS. CONST. pI. I, art. 30. 
89 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2042, 352 N.E.2d at 919. See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. I, § I, 
art. 4. 
90ld., citing Corning Class Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 363 ~ass. 409, 420-23, 294 
N.E.2d 354, 361-62 (1963) and Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 5 8, 600, 66 N.E. 607, 
608 (1903). 
911d. at 2042-43, 352 N.E.2d at 919, citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Safe 
Deposit & Trust Co., 348 Mass. 538, 544, 205 N.E.2d at 346, 351 (1965); Common-
wealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 525, 527, 95 N.E.2d at 666, 668 (I 95t); Commonwealth v. 
Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 341, 52 N.E.2d at 566,571 (1943). 
92 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2043-44,352 N.E.2d at 919. 
93 C.L. c. I50E, § 4. See note 28 supra for the ten standards. 
94 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2044, 352 N.E.2d at 919. 
95Id., 352 N.E.2d at 919-20. 
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entirely apart from the arbitration panel. 96 The Court pointed out 
that the panel establishes the obligation when it makes an award; the 
legislative body then must determine how this obligation is to be 
funded. Since the Court was satisfied that the enumerated safeguards 
constituted sufficient protection against arbitrariness,97 it found that 
the statute did not improperly delegate legislative power.98 
C. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
The town's third challenge to final and binding arbitration was that 
such arbitration violated the one-man one-vote principle of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.99 The town ar-
gued that in order to comport with the requirements of the four-
teenth amendment, an entity such as the arbitration panel that 
performs a legislative function must be elected rather than ap-
pointed. loo This argument was based on the rather tenuous legal 
proposition that since the arbitration panel exercised "classically 
legislative" functions, an election was constitutionally mandated. lol 
The town first contended that because the arbitration panel made 
core governmental decisions,102 it was classically a legislative body 
within the meaning given that term by the United States Supreme 
Court in Sailors v. Board of Education of the County if Kent. 103 It then 
96Id. at 2044-45, 352 N.E.2d at 919-20. The Court also rejected the town's distinction 
between "private" and "public" persons in its political accountability argument, see Brief 
for Appellant at 22, having earlier decided that delegations to private persons were not 
forbidden so long as proper safeguards were provided. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2045, 
352 N.E.2d at 919, 920, citing Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 363 Mass. 
409,420,294 N.E.2d 354, 360-61 (1973). In the same paragraph, the Court found au-
thority for the proposition that a person may be deemed a public official where he is 
fulfilling duties which are public in nature, "involving in their performance the exercise 
of some portion of the sovereign power, whether great or small." Id., citing Attorney 
Gen. v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 535, 48 N.E. 279, 281 (1897). 
97 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 352 N.E.2d at 920. These safeguards included the ten 
standards, the procedure for negotiation, mediation and factfinding, and the guarantee 
of judicial review. Id. at 2044, 2046, 352 N.E.2d at 919, 920. 
98Id. 
99 Brief for Appellant at 37-38, citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 7-8 (1964). The one-man, one-vote principle is grounded 
on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The principle grants to 
the voter a constitutional right to vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully 
denied, debased or diluted by the apportionment of state legislatures. See Reynolds, 377 
U.S. at 557-58. 
100 Brief for Appellant at 38-39. 
101Id. 
102 The town asserted that the panel made decisions as to resource allocation, disposi-
tion of tax revenue, and organizational structure and performance standards. Brief for 
Appellant at 41-42. 
103 387 U.S. lOS, 110 (1966). The Court held that an election was not required for 
county school board members because the offices were administrative and not legisla-
tive in the classical sense. In Town of Arlington, the town contended that a classically 
legislative body was one with the "power to make a large number of decisions having a 
broad range of impacts on all the citizens" of the municipality, as defined by the Su-
preme Court in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483. Brief for Appellant at 42. 
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contended that an arbitration panel exercising legisl tive functions of 
this scope must be elected, rather than appointed, in order that it 
comport with "the fundamental constitutional prine pIe underlying a 
representative democracy that those persons exercisi g the basic legis-
lative powers be politically accountable representatives. l04 
The Court rejected the first argument, noting that in Sailors the 
county school board had powers greater in scope than those entrusted 
to the arbitration pane1.105 Even where the board had broad powers 
the Sailors Court had found that the school board was not exercising 
general legislative powers.106 Thus, the arbitration panel could not be 
described as exercising broad legislative powers. 
The Court noted that the arbitration panel's role as limited solely 
to resolving a collective bargaining impasse by sele ting one of two 
final offers of the parties. As such, the Court conclu ed that the panel 
could not be described according to the standards enerally used to 
determine legislative responsibility-as "a unit of ocal government 
with general responsibility and power for local affairs"lo7 or a unit 
"with general governmental powers over an entire geographic 
area, .... "108 With respect to the second part of the town's argument, 
that an election was constitutionally mandated, the Court found such 
an argument to be without merit since in the Court's view the arbitra-
tion panel does not perform legislative functions. lo9 ( 
D. MUNICIPAL FINANCE LAW CONFLICT 
The town's final challenge asserted that the pro IS10ns of section 
The town felt that the arbitration panel fit this description because it made core gov-
ernmental decisions as to resource allocation, disposition of tax monies within a com-
munity, as well as decisions regarding the organizational structure and performance 
standards of municipal departments. [d. at 41-42. 
104 Brief for Appellants at 42, citing MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 4. The town argued that 
the unanswered question of the Sailors case, "whether a state may onstitute a local legis-
lative body through the appointive rather than the elective proc ss," was squarely pre-
sented in this case, once the court decided that the arbitration pa el exercised classically 
legislative powers." [d. at 39. See Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110. 
105 The Supreme Judicial Court noted that in Sailors the count school board was re-
sponsible for, "among other things," the appointment of a coun y school superintend-
ent, preparation of an annual budget and levy of taxes, distr bution of delinquent 
taxes, employment of teachers for special educational programs, nd the assignment of 
areas to particular school districts. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047,352 N.E.2d at 921, cit-
ing Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110 n.7. 
106 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048, 352 N.E.2d at 921, citing Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110-11. 
107 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 352 N.E.2d at 921, quoting from Avery v. Midland 
County, 390 U.S. 474, 483 (1968). 
108 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 352 N.E.2d at 921, quoting from Avery v. Midland 
County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968). I 
109 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048, 352 N.E.2d at 921 (1976). E en assuming that the 
arbitration panel was a legislative body, the Supreme Court in S ilors had reserved the 
question .Of whether the state may appoint, rather than have e1e ted, a local legislative 
body. 387 U.S. at 111. Within the Commonwealth there was aut ority for the proposi-
tion that the Legislature has broad powers to provide that mu icipal officers be ap-
pointed rather than elected. See Moore v. Election Commissione s of Cambridge, 309 
Mass. 303, 321-22, 35 N.E.2d 222, 234 (1941). 50
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4110 providing that the panel's selection shall be final and binding 
upon the parties and upon the appropriate legislative body, were in-
consistent with municipal finance laws, and that the latter should pre-
vail. 111 In support of this challenge, the town asserted that the fund-
ing of the arbitration awards in question would be in excess of ap-
propriations for the department of public safety of the Town of Ar-
lington. Consequently, the implementation of the award would violate 
section 31 of Chapter 44 of the General Laws,112 which provides that 
a town department may not incur a liability in excess of the appropri-
ations made for its use, except in extreme emergency by majority vote 
of all selectmen. In addition, the town urged the Court to adopt the 
rule of past decisions that interpreted the purpose of finance laws as 
being 
. . . to set rigid barriers against expenditures in excess of appro-
priations, to prevent the borrowing of money for current expenses, 
to confine the making of long time loans strictly to raising money 
for permanent improvements, and in general to put cities upon a 
sound financial basis so far as these ends can be achieved by legis-
lation ... .11 3 
Given these important purposes, the town argued, such laws required 
strict adherence, even at the expense of other laws.114 
The Court, in rejecting this argument, pointed to the specific provi-
sion in section 4115 that the award be binding upon the appropriate 
legislative body and enforceable thereafter in the superior court. 116 
This language was interpreted as a legislative signal that "awards 
made under the statute shall be satisfied on a mandatory basis by 
municipal appropriation thereafter."117 Noting its previous interpreta-
tion of section 31 of chapter 44 as a municipal control on "irresponsi-
ble spending by departments of local governments,"118 the Court dis-
tinguished this purpose from requiring local spending to fund a valid 
110 C.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
111 Brief for Appellant at 49. 
112 Brief for Appellant at 52-53. C.L. c. 44, § 31 provides in part: 
No department financed by municipal revenue, or in whole or in part by taxation, 
of any city or town, except Boston, shall incur a liability in excess of the appropria-
tion made for the use of such department, each item recommended by the mayor 
and voted by the council in cities, and each item voted by the town meeting in 
towns, being considered as a separate appropriation, except in cases of extreme 
emergency involving the health or safety of persons or property, and then only by 
a vote in a city of two-thirds of the members of the city council, and in a town by a 
majority vote of all the selectmen .... 
113 Brief for Appellant at 50, quoting from Flood v. Hodges, 231 Mass. 252, 256, 120 
N.E. 689, 689 (1918). 
114 Brief for Appellant at 50-51. 
lIS C.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
116 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048, 352 N.E.2d at 921. 
117 [d. 
118 [d., quoting from Board of Health of North Adams v. Mayor of North Adams, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2708, 2723-24, 334 N.E.2d 34, 41 (1975). 
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state program,u9 Since section 4 was viewed by the cburt to be such a 
valid state program, it directed the town's finance committee and town 
meeting to fund the arbitrator's award. 120 I 
E. COMMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENdES 
In exploring the Court's analysis of the town's fourlspecific constitu-
tional challenges, it is difficult to conceive of a dif~erent conclusion 
being reached, given the particular constitutional provisions, general 
laws, and case law that the Court was called upon to examine. 
Although the Massachusetts Home Rule Amendmeqt is of the "self-
executing" variety insofar as a municipality may act )vithout interven-
ing legislative action,121 the amendment provides "for a sharing of 
legislative power, rather than for the separation of powers between 
state and locallevels."122 This arrangement resembleJ J the relationship 
between the states and the federal government whereby the states may 
legislate in areas where the federal government may later assert its 
supremacy.123 This "sharing" of powers, with its P~SSibility of state 
preemption by general legislation pursuant to sectio s 6 and 8 of the 
Home Rule Amendment124 makes the apparent p wers granted to 
municipalities by the Home Rule Amendment illusory. The wages of 
municipal police and firemen may affect the wages o~ other municipal 
employees and also affect the scope of the total budget. As such, the 
power to set wages is a matter of peculiar local concern. Accordingly, 
one would have expected the power to set municipal wages to be at 
the heart of the Home Rule Amendment's grant of! power, and the 
last subject to be taken from local determination. Yeti, an amendment 
which at first glance appears to grant plenary powers to cities and 
towns also reserves the right to take it all back by g)neral legislation. 
The fact that the subject of such general legislation was one of fun-
damental and arguably exclusive local concern was 0 no consequence 
to the General Court when it determined that more meaningful col-
lective bargaining rights were needed in this area. Tqe legislature was 
able to grant these collective bargaining rights by gfneral legislation 
without violating the Home Rule Amendment. 
Town of Arlington's result proves, as the Court suggests, that while 
the municipality is granted broad powers to act on I municipal prob-
lems by the Home Rule Amendment, a very narrow area of disability 
is imposed on the state legislature. l2S Although section 8 of the 
amendment denies the legislature the power to single out a town or 
I 
119 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048, 352 N.E.2d at 921. 
120 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049,352 N.E.2d at 921. 
121 Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 143 n.4, 293 T.E.2d 268, 273 n.4 
(1973). 
122 [d., quoting/rom 1965 SEN. Doc. No. 950, at 49. 
123 Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 150 n.9, 293 N.E.2d 268, 277 n.9 
(1973). 
124 MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, §§ 6, 8. 
125 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2040, 352 N.E.2d at 918. 
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municipality for special legislative treatment,126 it grants the state 
legislature the power to make general laws affecting all cities and 
towns, or any class of not fewer than two, without considering 
whether the subject matter of the legislation is of peculiar local con-
cern. The General Court may regulate the arguably core concerns of 
local government in an evenhanded fashion, as long as it does not dis-
criminate against a single local government. Such "general law" 
power in a Home Rule Amendment that does not explicitly delineate 
areas of local concern. where the state legislature may not become in-
volved results in broad state authority to legislate on municipal prob-
lems, with a narrow area reserved to municipalities to regulate only 
the most unique of local problems. No vote by the representatives of a 
town which has adopted a home rule charter can negate such a gen-
erallaw, despite its concern with local issues.127 
Binding arbitration statutes for public sector employees have sur-
vived this type of constitutional challenge in other states with similar 
constitutional provisions.128 Only where state constitutions or legisla-
tive provisions have reserved to the local legislative body the exclusive 
authority to set wages, or where statewide legislation is prohibited on 
matters of "predominantly local concern" and wage-setting is de-
termined to be such a local concern, have statewide binding arbitra-
tion statutes similar to chapter 150E failed. 129 Unless the General 
Court spells out in future legislation its intention that the power to set 
wages is one of peculiar local concern in the area of public employee 
labor relations, challenges similar to that raised by the town under the 
126 See MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 8, granting the general court power to 
make general laws which apply alike to all cities and towns or to a "class of not fewer 
than two." 
127 See Del Duca v. Town Administrator of Methuen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1792,329 
N.E.2d 748. 
128 See Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 397-98 (Me. 1973) 
(challenge involving improper delegation); Dearborn Firefighters Union v. Dearborn, 
394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975) (challenges involving home rule provision of 
constitution and surrendering of tax power) (equally divided court upheld unanimous 
decision of an intermediate appellate court which found statute constitutional); Amster-
dam v. Helsby, 371 N.Y.2d 19, 42, 332 N.E.2d 290, 303, 311 N.Y.S.2d 404, 421 (1975) 
(challenges involving Home Rule Amendment, delegation of power, and equal protec-
tion); Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemens Ass'n, 106 R.l. 109, 117-18, 256 A.2d 206, 
211 (1969) (challenge involving improper delegation); State v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 
305 (Wyo. 1968) (same). 
129 See Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal.3d 22, 24, 553 P.2d 1140, 1143, 
132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1976) (unconstitutional delegation by state legislature); Greeley 
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790, 793 (Col. 1976) (same); Bea-
verton v. Int'l Ass'n. of Firefighters Local 1660, Ore. ,531 P.2d 730, 736-37 
(1975) (labor relations statute providing for binding arbitration held to violate state con-
stitution where previous decisions had prohibited statewide legislation on matters "pre-
dominantly of local concern"); Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 234 
N .W.2d 35, 38 (S.D. 1975) (constitutional provision making the setting of salaries an ex-
clusive legislative function of city precludes state legislation providing binding arbitra-
tion for firefighters); State v. Johnson, 46 Wash.2d 114, 120-21, 278 P.2d 662, 666 
(1955) (fixing of wages a non-delegable legislative function under statute creating city's 
powers). 
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Home Rule Amendment will ultimately be subordinalted to the Legis-
lature's power to make "generallaw."130 
The town's improper delegation challenge utilized language in the 
Commonwealth's Constitution131 that provided thel widest possible 
scope for the town's political accountability argument .132 This unique 
approach constituted an attempt by the town to give constitutional 
content to many of the policy arguments it had set I forth under the 
improper delegation challenge. 133 The Court, hO\\jever, concluded 
that these policy arguments were ultimately matters of legislative wis-
dom.134 Consequently, the Court reduced the town's challenge to the 
more familiar delegation considerations that it had d~scussed in Corn-
ing Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc. 13S Applying I its Corning ap-
proach,136 the Court was able to distinguish between the improper del-
egation of legislative power to make laws and the Pioper delegation 
of the power to implement the details of a legislative policy. It found 
that the specific standards provided for the arbitrato s, when coupled 
with negotiation, mediation, factfinding and judicial review, provided 
adequate protection against arbitrary action.137 By plflCing its faith in 
the ten standards surrounded by these other procequral safeguards, 
the Court was able to ignore the town's assertion that it was precisely 
when the ten standards pointed in different directions that the panel 
was left free to substitute its own view on such subjecltive standards as 
"the interests and welfare of the public."138 Whethet such views are 
characterized as equitable or arbitrary, they result from a recognition 
that no universally accepted objective criteria exist to settle public sec-
tor wage and benefit disputes. 139 Unlike the private s¢ctor, public per-
sonnel costs reflect a decision more political than etonomic. Within 
the collective bargaining relationship that section 4 of chapter 150E 
envisioned, it seems proper to allow the arbitration ~anel to consider 
this political factor of public interest. 140 I 
130 MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 8. 
131 MASS. CONST .. pt. 1, art. V. 
132 See notes 66-87 supra and accompanying text. 
133 These policy arguments are best summarized by the topical heading of the town's 
second argument: "Acts of 1973, c.l078, §4, is not consonant with the constitutional 
exercise of political power in a representative democracy." Brief ~or Appellant at 13. 
Identical language appears in the opinion of Levin, j., in Dearborn.lFirefighter's Union, 
Local 412 v. Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 233, 231 N.W.2d 226, 229 (1975). Such broad 
language, in its political overtones, is matched by the equally broad language of part 
one, article five, of the Massachusetts Constitution. See note 69 SUPT1 and accompanying 
text. 
134 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049-51,352 N.E.2d at 921-22. 
135 363 Mass. 409, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973). 
136 See id. at 420-24, 294 N.E.2d at 360-63. 
137 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2042-44, 352 N.E.2d at 919-20. I 
138 Brief for Appellant at 25, citing G.L. c.150E, §4, standard (2). 
139 [d. at 24-25. 
140 The Court's approach to the delegation problem, while basically sound, did not 
view an examination of the practical consequences of allowing such legislative delega-
tion as within the judicial domain. See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 204$-52, 352 N.E.2d at 
921-22. It viewed the procedural safeguards of a neutral arbitrator,1 hearing, admission 
54
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/10
§6.10 LABOR LAW 211 
Little can be said in support of the town's contention that the pro-
visions of section 4 conflict with municipal finance laws and that those 
finance laws should prevail. Section 7 of chapter 150E provides that a 
public employee collective bargaining agreement prevails over any 
municipal personnel ordinance, by-law, rule, or regulation. 141 Under 
the 1965 statute, the terms of a public employment collective bargain-
ing agreement were subordinate to municipal ordinances, by-laws, 
rules, regulations and statutes.142 Accordingly, the specific language of 
section 7 indicates a legislative intent that collective bargaining 
agreements under the new law be elevated to a higher status in order 
to create more meaningful negotiations from the point of view of the 
employee organization.143 The Court in Town of Arlington properly 
notes that nothing in section 31 of chapter 44144 prevents the towns 
from funding by appropriation an arbitration award that results from 
valid state legislation.145 
The Commonwealth's 1973 binding arbitration statute appears to be 
a carefully drafted legislative document. The Legislature has seem-
ingly considered and provided for all the potential constitutional chal-
lenges based on the Home Rule Amendment, nondelegation theories, 
and conflicting municipal finance law. Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
any additional constitutional challenge would affect the Court's posi-
tion. 146 Notwithstanding that Town of Arlington firmly established the 
constitutional validity of final and binding arbitration, the Legislature 
must still determine whether such arbitration is responsible public pol-
icy.147 In making such a determination, the Legislature must balance 
of evidence, record of proceedings, transcript, and judicial review, see G.L. c.150E, §4, 
as tipping the scales in its consideration of the "totality of the protection against arbi-
trariness." [d. at 2046,352 N.E.2d at 920, quoting from K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE 54 (Supp. 1970). Professor Davis, while emphasizing the need for procedural 
safeguards to buttress statutory standards furnished to protect those affected by ad-
ministrative action from arbitrary results, has also criticized state court opinions which, 
among other things, fail to consider the practical consequences of allowing the legisla-
ture to do what it is trying to do. See K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 2,06 at 
39-40 (1972). This commentary takes the position that the type of practical conse-
quences of chapter 150E, section four, advanced by the town in its non-delegation and 
political accountability arguments, see Brief for Appellant at 13-37, are best considered 
by the state's legislative body. 
141 G.L. c. 150E, § 7. 
142 Acts of 1965, c. 763, § 1781. 
143 Sherry, Labor Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 2,12, at 28. 
144 G.L. c. 44, § 31. See note 112 supra for the relevant text of this section, 
145 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048-49,352 N,E.2d at 921. 
146See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh, at 2050-51,352 N.E.2d at 922. ("In this opinion we have 
considered the specific constitutional challenges advanced by the town and found them 
insufficient to render the act invalid, , , , We see no constitutional impediment to the 
legislature's structuring municipal labor relations in the manner provided in the act,") 
147 Section 8 of the Acts of 1973, c. 1078, indicates that the provisions of § 4 shall 
terminate on June 30, 1977, Prior to this date the General Court must determine 
whether this temporary law shall be repealed, extended to other public employee 
groups, continued in its present form, replaced, or modified. See note 214 infra. 
For a recent study measuring the results of final offer arbitration in the Common-
wealth, see Somers, AN EVALUATION OF FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 
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three often conflicting needs: (1) the need of publ c employees for 
meaningful collective bargaining rights; (2) the com unity's need for 
uninterrupted services in areas critical to the public haith, safety, and 
welfare; and (3) the need of cities and towns to bala ce their munici-
pal budgets, and to have some control over the costs and efficiency of 
municipal services. 
The remainder of this comment will consider this balancing of 
needs within the framework of those factors underlying the evolution 
of public employee labor legislation. It will examine the three basic 
options available for providing "finality" in collectiv bargaining: the 
right to strike, unilateral determination, and bindi g arbitration. It 
will conclude that despite its several weaknesses, bi ding arbitration 
remains the only viable alternative to resolutions 0 impasse in the 
area of police and fire personnel. Finally, it will be su mitted that with 
proper safeguards, the conflicting needs of empl yees and com-
munities can be fulfilled by the arbitration process. 
II. BINDING ARBITRATION AS AN ApPROPRIATE PUBLIC SECTOR IMPASSE TOOL 
Any discussion of collective bargaining impasse alternatives in the 
public sector must first examine the interplay betw en those factors 
which established the need for collective bargaining 'n this area, and 
the sovereignty defense, long available to the govern ent-as-employer 
in denying such collective bargaining rights. This in erplay highlights 
the differences between public and private sector c llective bargain-
ing, and the need for different impasse solutions in t e two areas. 
Union growth in public employment is commonly attributed to a set 
of favorable circumstances that coincided in the early 1960's. An 
executive order by President Kennedy in 1962148 signaled a more fa-
vorable policy toward union recognition in the public sector. 149 Public 
November, 1976 (research report made possible by a grant to Ma~aChusetts League of 
Cities and Towns from the U.S. Civil Service Commission under th Intergovernmental 
Personnel Act (P.L. 91-6481); available at the offices of Mass. eague of Cities and 
Towns, 6 Beacon St., Boston, Mass.); hereinafter cited as Somers Re ort. 
148 Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1969) (employe -management coop-
eration in the federal service). This order gave to employees of he Federal Govern-
ment the right to form, join, and assist any employee organizatio , or to refrain from 
any such activity. ld. at § l(a). Section 2 defined "employee organization" to mean "any 
lawful association, labor organization, federation, council, or brotherhood having as a 
primary purpose the improvement of working conditions among Federal employees, or 
any craft, trade or industrial union whose membership includes both Federal employees 
and employees of private organizations .... " This definition expressly did not include 
any organization that (I) asserted the right to strike against the government or any 
agency thereof, (2) advocates the overthrow of the constitutional fo m of government in 
the United States, or (3) which discriminates with regard to the te ms or conditions of 
membership because of race, color, creed, or national origin. /d. at 2. 
149 Those policies were later to be liberalized in President Nix n's Executive Order 
No. 11491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969). This order established a Fe eral Labor Relations 
Council, § 4; a Federal Services Impasses Panel, § 4; Exclusive re ognition, § 10; and 
Grievance Procedures, § 13. 
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employment was expanding to include new and younger groups, 
which were both more receptive to unionization and increasingly dis-
satisfied with the personnel practices of government managers. 150 Job 
security and retirement benefits, the early attractions of public 
employment, were being matched or surpassed by the results of col-
lective bargaining in the private sector,151 and public employees were 
falling behind private employees in wages and benefits. 152 The expan-
sion of government into transit, housing and other fields closely re-
lated to private industry brought previously unionized employees into 
the public sector, and contributed to organizational efforts.153 
Efforts to achieve collective bargaining rights were also motivated by 
many of the same factors that inspired employees in private industry 
to unionize decades earlier. As the number of employees involved in 
public employment increased and the bureaucracy became more ex-
tended, there developed an increasing sense of powerlessness on the 
part of the individual worker. Workers sensed that the collective voice 
of all fellow employees was more powerful than individual voices in 
establishing control over the conditions of employment.154 Public 
employees found that as an interest group they could produce politi-. 
cal pressure by working to elect local public officials sympathetic to 
their needs,155 and that they were capable of presenting a united voice 
on political issues that went beyond their specific working condi-
tions. 156 It was thought that such an organization could equalize the 
bargaining power of employer and employee. 157 
However, it also became clear that collective pressure could lead to 
disruption unless existing decision making procedures relative to terms 
and conditions of public employment were accommodated to include 
public employees. As in private industry, legislation that allows for 
unionization and provides collective bargaining rights in the public 
sector reflects a policy judgment that the benefits of shared de-
cis ion making outweigh the social and economic costs. According to 
this policy judgment, the benefit of allowing public employees to par-
ticipate in the determination of their employment conditions justifies 
the potential cost of an increase in the price of public employee per-
sonnel over that incurred when public employers were free to uni-
laterally determine the conditions of employment. 
150 See BOK & DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 312-14 (1970). 
151 See WELLINGTON AND WINTER, UNIONS AND THE CITIES (Studies of Unionism in 
Government/Brookings Institute), 14 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WELLINGTON AND 
WINTERJ. 
152Id. 
153 BOK & DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 323 (1970). 
154 See WELLINGTON AND WINTER. supra note 151, at 8-12. . 
155Id. at 13-14. 
156Id. 
157Id. at 13-14. Wellington and Winter note, however, that the unequal bargaining 
power argument is not as dearly analogous to the private sector, where imperfections 
relate to economic market pressure. In the public sector, imperfections relate to the 
political process, where economic considerations are "but one criterion among many." 
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The considerations of public employee growth, olitical pressure, 
and unequal bargaining power clearly suggested a n ed for some type 
of legislation regulating public employee labor relati ns. Without such 
enabling legislation early attempts at union organiz tion for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining were thwarted by the otion of govern-
mental sovereignty. Sovereignty, the "supreme, a solute, and un-
controllable power by which any independen state is gov-
erned ... ,"158 gave the public employer a defense to employee de-
mands to negotiate for many decades.I59 Collective b rgaining, with its 
notion of countervailing power, would necessarily infringe on the 
power of the. government and the sovereignty of the state. I60 
Moreover, since sovereignty also means that the go ernment can be 
sued only if it consents to suit,I6I a governmental e tity could not be 
compelled to enter into any collective bargaining relationship in-
voluntarily. Therefore, collective bargaining agree ents, to be en-
forceable, required legislation mandating that the overnment take 
such action,I62 and providing for the enforcement 0 such agreements 
158 Black's Law Dictionary 1568 (4th ed., 1968), cited in WE INGTON AND WINTER 
supra note 151, at 36. 
159 See e.g., WELLINGTON AND WINTER supra note 151, at 36 citing Railway Mail 
Association v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 rev'd on other grounds 
sub. nom. Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 470, a d, 293 N.Y. 315, 56 
N.E.2d 721 afJ'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945): 
To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service emplo ees of the govern-
ment as a labor organization or union is not only incompatibl with the spirit of 
democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which ur government is 
founded. Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than t admit that hired 
servants of the State can dictate to the government the hours, he wages and con-
ditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety 
and security of the citizen. To admit as true that government mployees have the 
power to halt or check the functions of government unless their demands are satis-
fied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive, and judic al power. Nothing 
would be more ridiculous. 180 Misc. N.Y. at 875. 
180 See WELLINGTON AND WINTER supra note 151, at 37. See, .g., Dade County v. 
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp., 157 o. 2d 176, 182 (Fla. 
1963). 
181 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824 . Immunity from lia-
bility in tort has been waived by the United States in the Federa Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504,2110,2401,2402,2411,2412,2671-2 80 (1970). 
182 Wisconsin, in 1959, became the first state to enact basic legisl tion covering munici-
pal employees. 1959 Wis. Laws c. 509, § I, creating WIS. STAT. § 11.70. In 1961, Wis-
consin was the first state to enact mediation and factfinding pr edures for resolving 
municipal disputes. 1961, Wis. Laws c. 633, § 1, amending WIS. SAT. § 11.70. In 1971 
Wisconsin passed legislation that provided for law enforcement and firefighting per-
sonnel. 1971 Wis. Laws, c. 247, creating WIS. STAT. § 111.77. See ally, Coughlin & 
Rader, Right to Strike and Compulsory Arbitration: Panacea or Place 1, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 
205 (1975). 
Some courts have even held, despite the absence of authorizing gislation, that public 
employers have discretionary authority to bargain collectively an to enter into valid 
agreements with unions representing their employees. See, e.g., G ry Teachers Local 4 
v. School City of Gary,-Ind. App.-284 N.E.2d 108 (1972); Ch cago Div. of Ill. Ed. 
Ass'n v. Board of Education, 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 1966). 
For a discussion of common law collective bargaining rights in the public sector, see 
A.L. Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union Security i the Public Sector, 17 
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 993, 1014-15 (1976). 58
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by judicial action. The use of "sovereignty" as a total defense to public 
employee collective bargaining rights has diminished in recent years. 
This has in large part been due to the tremendous growth in public 
sector employment, with its corresponding recognition of unequal 
bargaining power and consequent political pressure applied to obtain 
such bargaining rights. The issue today becomes not whether gov-
ernment power, or sovereignty, is supreme, but "how government as 
an employer ought to exercise that power."163 Once the need for 
public employee collective bargaining has been established, state legis-
lation such as chapter 150£164 recasts the sovereignty question as how 
much decisionmaking power the public employer will give up instead 
of refusing to share all power defensively labeled "sovereign." When 
impasse alternatives are considered, the recast question takes on new 
significance, and the differences between the public and private labor 
sectors become apparent. 
State statutes that regulate the collective bargaining of public 
employees, although varying in structure and detail, generally contain 
a procedure for determining questions of recognition of the collective 
bargaining unit through some form of petition, investigation, and 
election conducted by the labor relations commission,165 and an im-
passe procedure to be used when a public employer and union cannot 
agree upon the terms of a new contract. 166 Ideally, a voluntary 
agreement at the bargaining table between the two parties would be 
the most effective technique for determining terms and conditions of 
employment. When such a voluntary agreement is not reached in the 
private sector, the most potent economic weapon possessed by unions 
to produce the necessary collective bargaining finality is the strike. 
However, the strike has been declared illegal for public employees in 
all but very few jurisdictions.167 This creates the need for an impasse 
procedure to replace the forbidden strike in order to produce finality. 
In determining what constitutes an appropriate impasse procedure, 
the Legislature must balance three conflicting needs. First, the need 
of public employees for meaningful bargainmg rights must be pro-
tected. This would seem to be the purpose of enacting legislation rec-
ognizing public employee unions and granting those unions the right 
to bargain collectively. Such a need implies that public employees 
share equally with the public employer the responsibility of determin-
ing the terms and conditions of their employment. It means more 
than merely requiring the employer to meet and confer with the 
employees before deciding what the next employee contract will con-
tain. It requires that employees have a method of settling impasses 
163 WELLINGTON AND WINTER, supra note 151, at 37. 
164 G.L. c. 150E. 
165 See, e.g., G.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
166 G.L. c. 150E, §§ 4 (police and fire), 9, 9A. For a recent compilation of state public 
sector collective bargaining statutes, see A.L. Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: 
Union Security in the Public Sector, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 993, 994, n.5 (1976). 
167 For an example of a state statute authorizing strikes by public employees under 
limited circumstances, see ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (Supp. 1975-76). 
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that does not result in a form of unilateral determi ation by the em-
ployer. 
The second need that must be satisfied in any Ie . slative scheme is 
the community's need for uninterrupted services i areas critical to 
the public health, safety, and welfare. This need aries with public 
employee groups. It receives highest priority in the area of public 
safety, i.e., police and fire personnel, which is being considered here. 
While a community can tolerate, at least for a period of time, an in-
terruption in the services of its department clerks, or park employees, 
or even school teachers, it cannot tolerate such an interruption in 
police and fire service. The immediate social cost in both life and 
property would simply be too high. 
Finally, the need of cities and towns to balanc their municipal 
budgets, and to have some control over the costs and efficiency of 
police and fire employee services, must be consid red. Because the 
competitive and market pressures of the private sect r do not exist in 
the public sector, and because municipal budgetmaking is essentially a 
political process, care must be taken to protect this need. 
Those who advocate the right to strike,16s or a limited or graduated 
right to strike,169 as an impasse procedure in the public sector, believe 
that by putting collective bargaining in the public sector on the same 
footing as private negotiations, the time consuming rocess of negotia-
tion would be reduced. 170 Moreover, advocates of a right to strike 
contend that since in general strikes of public em pI yees do not bur-
den the community more than strikes in the priv te sector, public 
employees who perform services identical to those erformed by pri-
vate employees who have the right to strike should e no less favora-
bly situated. 1 71 Anti-strike legislation, if unduly harsh in the penalties 
it imposes on employee and union violators, may in fact result in pub-
lic sympathy for labor's cause, and create a need for specially-enacted 
legislation to alleviate the consequences of such a law-a self-defeating 
168 See Guinan, The Unreal Distinction Between Public and Private !ctors, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV. 46, 47, (Sept., 1973), commenting on New York City'S public transportation 
employees illegal strike of January, 1966, which resulted in the st agreement in the 
industry'S history, and special legislation exonerating all the stri ers from the drastic 
penalties of the no-strike laws.ld. 
169 See Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 459 
(1971). 
170 See BOK AND DUNLOP. LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY, at 334 (1970). 
171 See id. See generally "Pickets and City HaU"-Report and Recommendations of the Twen-
tieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment, GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 
(BNA) RF-I, 51:151 at 155-157 (1970). The task force agreed that strikes should be 
prohibited while parties are negotiating, or in mediation, or before a factfinding body, 
but split on whether strikes should be allowed when disputes have not yielded to 
negotiation, mediation and factfinding recommendations. ThOSrWhO approved of a 
right to strike at this point did so on the basis that fairness requi ed such a right when 
the government employer refused to accept the factfinder's recom endations after they 
had been made public. But even they believed that this limited ri ht to strike should be 
restrained when public health or safety are threatened. 
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proposition.172 Proponents of a right to strike further argue that col-
lective bargaining, without the power to strike, is an "exercise in futil-
ity,"173 because it provides no point at which the parties must either 
agree or test the economic or political strength of their position. 
Those opposed to strikes in the public sector point to the peculiar 
nature of the public employee strike. Unlike a strike in the private 
sector, a public employee strike is not checked by the forces of compe-
tition and other market pressures.174 The effectiveness of such a strike 
derives from its power to inconvenience the public enough to bring 
community pressure to bear on elected officials.175 Strikes in the pub-
lic sector may therefore distort the political process if they result in 
some public employee groups obtaining too much power relative to 
other interest groups.176 Moreover, when such strikes must be en-
joined, the determination that the health and safety of the public are 
unduly jeopardized involves political considerations and value judg-
ments that the judiciary is ill-suited to make.177 
The Massachusetts Legislature, prior to enacting its new public 
employee law, briefly considered departing from the absolute prohibi-
tion of public employee strikes if an impasse in negotiations continued 
after mediation and factfinding. 178 In rejecting the strike weapon, it is 
172 See Guinan, The Unreal Distinction Between Public and Private Sectors, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV. 46,47 (Sept., 1973). 
173Id. 
174 See BOK & DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 334. Such pressures in-
clude entry of non-union competitors, impact of foreign goods, substitution of capital 
for higher priced labor, shift of operations to low-cost areas, contracting out of high-
cost operations to other enterprises, shut-down of unprofitable plants and operations, 
redesign of products to meet higher costs, and managerial option to go out of business 
entirely.Id. 
175Id. at 335. Many employees with relatively little power to "inconvenience" the pub-
lic would obviously be better off under some alternate method of resolving disputes. 
The statutory grant of the right to strike for these groups would be of little value unless 
work stoppages could be carried out in association with other groups of public 
employees workIng in more critical areas. Those members of the Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force, see note 170 supra, who favored a blanket prohibition of the right to strike 
in the public sector believed that government workers constituted a special category in 
the labor force, who, having accepted public employment, committed themselves to 
public service, which should not be interrupted by dissatisfaction over working condi-
tions. Public employee strikes, under this view, disrupt the functioning of government 
and therefore undermine it. "Pickets at City Hall" -Report and Recommendations of the Twen-
tieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 
(BNA) RF-l, 51:151, at 156. 
176 WELLINGTON AND WINTER, supra note 151, at 167. 
177 See Cox & BOK, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 335 (1970). Since public 
sector collective bargaining involves the allocation of public resources, it can be argued 
that decisions affecting the wages, hours, and working conditions of public employees 
are more political than economic, and that a system of political settlement is preferable 
to settling impasses by economic coercion. See Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in 
Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969). 
178 1973 HOUSE Doc. No. 6194, app. B (bill modeled on Hawaiian legislation which 
granted public employees a limited right to strike. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-1 to 89-20 
(Supp. 1975)). See also 1973 SENATE Doc. No. 1771 and 1973 HOUSE Doc. No. 7715. 
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submitted that the General Court made the proper decision that those 
issues of public policy involved in setting a municipal budget are more 
political than economic in nature, and thus are too important to be 
decided by the economic force of a particular group. Municipal police 
and fire personnel would wield considerable pressure if granted the 
right to strike, precisely because such a work stoppage would evoke 
alarm in the community and concern for the public health and 
safety,179 thereby creating support for a quick settlement on union's 
terms. Public safety personnel with the right to strike would be the 
most powerful political interest group in the city since it would possess 
the power to compel a quick settlement on its own terms. In addition, 
the public's need for uninterrupted police and fire service precludes 
any consideration of the right to strike. Such a collective bargaining 
right must be subordinated to the public's continuing need for essen-
tial services and the municipality's need to establish its budget through 
political rather than economically coercive processes. 
Once the right to strike has been removed as a possible impasse 
alternative, the absence of a procedure that can overcome impasse 
both creates frustration and increases the threat of illegal action.180 
Two alternate solutions that can produce the necessary finality are 
unilateral dispute resolution by the appropriate legislative body,181 or 
a form of third party compulsory and binding arbitration. 
The first alternative, legislative dispute resolution182 would take ef-
fect after recommendations have been made by the factfinding body. 
If further mediation does not resolve the dispute, the appropriate 
legislative body reviews the dispute and enacts a statute prescribing 
the terms and conditions of employment. Factfinders' rec-
ommendations have presumptive validity but are not binding on the 
legislature. Such a procedure may work when the "appropriate legisla-
tive body" is entirely distinct from the government employer. Prob-
lems arise however, when the two are the same/83 or are closely re-
lated, or when the legislative body has created the impasse by refusing 
The Joint Legislative Committee on Public Service recommended that unions be 
given the right to strike under limited circumstances. See Segal, A Preliminary Analysis of 
the New Public Employees' Law in Massachusetts, BOSTON BAR]. 5, 9 Oanuary, 1974). 
179 Conversely, a strike by municipal librarians. or gardeners. would evoke little com-
munity pressure for immediate settlement, and would not threaten public health and 
safety. Such a right would have little value. 
180 The strike prohibition does not deter union threats of strikes to achieve a stronger 
bargaining position during negotiations. On occasion, these threats have been carried 
out. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931, 932 (1969). 
Moreover, having forbidden a pattern of conduct allowed in private sector labor re-
lations, the state's prosecution of strike prohibition violators can create as much sym-
pathy and honor for union leaders as it does public sentiment against the illegal action. 
Id. at 936. See also Guinan, The Unreal Distinction Between Public and Private Sectors, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 46 (Sept., 1973). 
181 See BOK & DUNLOP. LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 334 (1970). 
182Id. at 337-38. 
183 This would be the result when, for example, a school committee both negotiated 
the contract and had independent fiscal authority to insure appropriation. 
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to fund a collective agreement negotiated by the government em-
ployer.184 Because on the municipal level the role of government as 
the employer is likely to influence the exercise of its judgment in its 
role as the appropriating authority, such a legislative body is properly 
viewed as incapable of performing an impartial role in the collective 
bargaining process. On the one hand, decision by a legislative body 
would insure continuous service in the public safety area by providing 
the necessary finality, presuming that police and fire personnel did 
not engage in an illegal strike. Additionally, it would guarantee that 
cities and towns were able to exercise fiscal responsibility, because they 
would directly control, in the end, the cost of personnel service in this 
area. On the other hand, however, decision by a legislative body could 
accomplish such results only at the expense of meaningful collective 
bargaining rights for public employees. Such a result would obtain 
since the government employer could through its legislative body 
exert final control over the conditions of employment, thereby sub-
stantially reducing the significance of the employees' collective bar-
gaining rights. 
Once the strike has been removed as a coercive method for resolv-
ing public sector impasses, and legislative finality has been ruled out 
as eliminating meaningful collective bargaining rights, impartial third 
party determination becomes the only logical method for providing 
finality in police and fire collective bargaining.185 Binding arbitration 
insures that police and fire service will continue uninterrupted. It sub-
stitutes for the right to strike the power to submit impasses that have 
proceeded beyond mediation and factfinding to a panel of arbitrators 
for resolution. Arbitration also guarantees that public employees will 
have effective bargaining rights and not simply the right to attempt to 
influence a legislative body that is perceived as closely aligned to the 
government employer. Effective bargaining rights are guaranteed be-
cause each side, having failed to reach voluntary agreement, retains a 
spokesman on the arbitration panel to present its position to the neu-
tral arbitrator. Further, if used properly, arbitration can survive chal-
lenges that it destroys attempts to maintain municipal fiscal re-
sponsibility and upsets the traditional political framework. In this con-
text, an informed evaluation of the ten standards set out in section 
4,186 with proper emphasis placed on the municipality'S capability to 
184 Under G.L. c. 150E, § 7 this might occur in all areas of public employment within 
the Commonwealth except police and fire services. 
18. There are three basic forms of compulsory and binding arbitration. Under con-
ventional arbitration, the arbitrator may grant an award that differs from the final of-
fers of both parties. In tinal offer arbitration, the arbitrator proceeds on an issue-by-
issue basis choosing one of the parties' final offer, and is not free to fashion his own 
award. The third method, employed by the Commonwealth in G.L. c. 150E, § 4. is 
known as "total-package" final offer arbitration. Here the arbitrator must select the 
final offer of one party or the other. Such final offer may include a number of issues, 
but the arbitrator is not free to pick the best offer of one side or the other on each is-
sue. 
186 G.L. C. 150E, § 4. 
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meet costl87 and a comparison with the wages and b nefits received by 
other municipal employees,188 can result in an arbi ration award that 
is not fiscally irresponsible and does not upset the t aditional political 
framework of budget allocation. 
The policy arguments against compulsory arbitra ion are well doc-
umented.189 Third party settlement may encourage the parties to ab-
dicate their responsibility to settle disputes, stiflin or making per-
functory any collective bargaining prior to arbitrati n.190 Compulsory 
arbitration also does not produce a voluntary agree ent between the 
parties, a paramount goal of collective bargaining. ather, it imposes 
one from outside the bargaining relationship.llll Fi ally, the arbitra-
tion panel makes an important governmental decis on when it issues 
an award, but unlike the government, it is not a poli ically accountable 
body.192 
These arguments are not without merit. Ideally, eaningful collec-
tive bargaining, in which each side recognizes the otives and condi-
tions faced by the other, and the condition of publi employment, re-
sults in voluntary agreement. The parties may be en ouraged to reach 
this voluntary agreement through mediation, even . n the final stages 
of factfinding and prior to the arbitration award, but the emphasis 
remains on peaceful voluntary agreements that are ot imposed from 
outside the bargaining relationship. Arbitration is hird party settle-
ment. Unless it is used only as a last resort it will, as its critics rec-
ognize, "chill" good faith bargaining between partie .193 Additionally, 
the arbitration panel's decision is one that, were it not for collective 
bargaining, would be made by a body of govern ent officials who 
were politically accountable. Any discussion of the elative merits of 
binding interest arbitration must recognize at the 0 tset that it is not 
an ideal solution, or one that can succeed if it is over sed. 
However, once the state legislature has made a porcy judrment that 
public employees be given collective bargaining ghts,lll·· any uni-
lateral determination of employment terms by the government em-
ployer is inconsistent with those bargaining rights. ollective bargain-
ing implies mutual participation in resolving impasse disputes, not uni-
lateral imposition by one of the parties. The I gislative finality 
alternative presents the possibility that the employ r will be able to 
impose his terms on the employees. The right to s rike presents the 
alternate possibility that public safety personnel will be able to coerce 
the employer, through community pressure, to ret rn essential ser-
187 /d., standard (1). See note 28 supra. 
188 [d., standard (4). See note 28 supra. 
189 See Brief for Appellant at 13-37, and text at notes 66-87. 
190 See, e.g., Somers Report, supra note 147, at 22-27. 
191 Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Sector Labor Relati ns, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
459 (1971). 
192 See Brief for Appellant at 23-25, and text at notes 77-87. 
193 See, e.g., Somers Report, supra note 147, at 22-27. 
194 See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text. 
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vices by submitting to employee demands. Only an independent third 
party can produce the desired finality by peacefully resolving impasse 
disputes while balancing the conflicting needs of the parties. This 
third party must be given proper standards to guide its decision,195 
and it must consciously represent the public interest. 
Arbitration, not as the uniform method of resolving public sector 
labor disputes which replaces good faith negotiations, but as a 
mechanism that produces finality when all efforts to encourage volun-
tary settlement have failed in the critical area of public safety, is the 
only alternative to withdrawing from these employees the right to in-
fluence the terms and conditions of their employment. 
To remain a viable alternative, binding arbitration must not have a 
"chilling" effect on collective bargaining. The General Court, in enact-
ing chapter 150E, chose final offer, "total package" arbitration as the 
favored method of third party settlement in police and fire collective 
bargaining impasses. Under this method, the cost of losing an award 
is potentially severe, for unlike conventional or issue-by-issue arbitra-
tion, the arbitrator lacks the power to create an award that differs 
from either party's offer (conventional arbitration), or to fashion an 
award by picking between the final offers of the parties on each issue 
(issue-by-issue). The requirement that the arbitrator choose one entire 
offer or the other seeks to compel the parties to bargain seriously 
prior to an impasse that ultimately reaches arbitration, rather than to 
submit offers to an arbitrator with the assurance that his award will 
reflect a compromise of the two. Ideally, "total package" arbitration 
should narrow both the total number of issues in dispute that go to 
arbitration and the particular position of the parties on each issue.196 
The need for public interest representation is perhaps the most 
unique characteristic of public employee collective bargaining. Public 
interest requires uninterrupted service in the area of public safety, 
which the binding arbitration statute produces. But it also requires 
service to taxpaying citizens focusing on efficiency, productivity, cost 
of service and quality of service.197 The public interest is diffuse, dif-
ficult to apply, and not capable of being represented at the bargaining 
table by the government employer acting in an adversary role. If pub-
lic interest is inconsistent with the notion that the most powerful 
employee organization be able to coerce settlements with the employer 
through the strike,198 it is also inconsistent with the notion that the 
employer be able to impose his demands on the employee groups. 
Both notions run counter to the legislative endorsement of meaning-
ful public employee collective bargaining rights in chapter 150E, and 
the selection of arbitration as a means of balancing public employer-
employee power in the area of public safety personnel. 
195 See, e.g., C.L. c. 150£, § 4. 
,.6 See Somers Report, supra note 147, at 22-27. 
197 See Bennett, The Public Interest in Labor Disputes, 25 LAB. L.J. 673 (1974). 
198 See notes 168-80 supra and accompanying text. 
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Finally, the arbitration panel must guard the need of the municipal-
ity to be fiscally responsible. One essential standard that guides the 
arbitration panel in making its award is the "abilii to pay" of the 
town or municipality.199 This standard protects th crucial need of 
cities and towns to balance their budgets and control the costs and ef-
ficiency of employee service. It is central to the effectiveness and ac-
ceptability of arbitration. Ideally an arbitration panel would reach the 
most equitable decision when it developed expertis~ in the areas of 
sources of revenue, budget allocations, borrowi g capability of 
municipalities! total labor costs including other labo groups not be-
fore it, and possible effects of its award on other employee groups. 
Where only public safety personnel may use compulsory arbitration, 
their awards will affect the municipality's abili1 to pay other 
employees. This effect, however, is almost impossibl to gauge by the 
arbitration panel unless it has mastered the entire budgetary process 
of the municipality. This task is unrealistic for the a hoc arbitration 
panel. A permanent arbitration board, however, given its own re-
search staff to gather data independent of that offered by either 
party, might over a period of time obtain the sOPhilication that one-
time, adhoc panels have been criticised as lacking.2 0 Therefore, the 
arbitration procedure can meet the need for sophis icated evaluation 
of municipal finance, and for realistic determinatio s of the munici-
pality's ability to "meet costs" by substituting an arbitration board for 
adhoc panels, and equipping that board with a research staff to com-
pile meaningful financial data. The criteria for selectrn to that board 
would be expertise both in labor relations and munici al finance. 
The timeliness of the panel's award is also crucial to the effective-
ness of arbitration in protecting the fiscal responsibility of the local 
government. As the Court in Town of Arlington recognized, an arbitra-
tion panel is without the power to determine how ~unicipal govern-
ment must meet financial obligations.201 It does not ave the power to 
tax directly, or to allocate resources, or to determ'ne levels of ser-
vice.202 Yet, because of the influence it exerts on th se decisions, it is 
crucial that negotiations be coordinated with the appropriate munici-
pal fiscal year, so that proposed increases can be taken into account 
for the coming year. Increases in compensation afrr a budget has 
been established mean either deficit spending or reo dering of public 
priorities.203 Despite statutory time restraints, it ofte takes a year or 
199 G.L. c. 150E, § 4, standard (1). 
200 This is not to say that the limited tenure of ad hoc panels ipPlies political irre-sponsibility. Such panels are economical in preventing additional st te bureaucracy. But 
where the overriding concern is for sophisticated evaluation of municipal finance, con-
sideration of such a change might be warranted. 
201 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2044,352 N.E.2d at 919-20. 
202 Such power is clearly not granted by the statute creating arbitration panels for 
police and fire impasse resolution. See G.L. c. 150E, § 4. 
203 The latter can result in money being taken from capital bUdg~ts, agencies less able 
to resist cuts, and from services whose recipients have the least poli ical muscle. See BOK 
& DUNLOP. LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 330 (1970). Add'tional problems can 
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longer for collective bargaining to pass through the impasse stages of 
mediation, factfinding, and arbitration.204 Where such impasse pro-
ceeds through arbitration, every effort must be made to conform to 
the time constraints of the new law if municipal fiscal deadlines are to 
be met.205 
An arbitration panel capable of rendering a timely decision when 
called upon to do so, and one which can properly determine what the 
municipality can afford to pay, will be able to protect the need of 
cities and towns to manage their budgets. In addition, since the arbi-
tration process also guarantees that police and fire personnel will have 
meaningful bargaining rights, and that the community will have un-
interrupted service in the area of public safety, it will have balanced 
the needs of those three interest groups most concerned with safe, ef-
ficient, and meaningful public employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The success of binding arbitration as an impasse procedure for 
police and fire personnel in the Commonwealth can be measured in 
many ways.206 Employee groups may bargain to impasse during the 
new device's initial years in an effort to test the arbitration procedure. 
This "curiosity factor" must be accounted for in any analysis of the ef-
ficacy of the statute.207 Any decision about the long-term future of 
result when public officials seek to estimate probable wage increases in establishing their 
budgets for the ensuing year. Negotiation tends to involve a search for these allowances 
on the part of employee organizations and a race among organizations to secure their 
share before allowances for increases have been used up. [d. 
204 Somers Report, supra note 147 Appendix, Exhibit 10. 
20. It is suggested that formation of an arbitration board would have the added ben-
efit of saving time where conflicting schedules of ad-hoc arbitrators might often create 
considerable time delay. In addition, since arbitration is preceded by factfinding at 
which both parties presumably submit the same evidence that ultimately will be sub-
mitted to the panel, the factfinder's recommendations should be treated as the basis of 
the panel's considerations, with the parties having the burden of persuading the panel 
to revise the factfinder's report. 
206 The Somers Report, supra note 147 appears to be the first quantitative analysis 
which adopts a framework in which to test the new law's effectiveness. The procedural 
and operational tests the report employs are discussed in Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration: 
Concepts, Developments and TechnUjues, PELR 50 (Chicago: International Personnel Man-
agement Association, 1975),56 pp. 
207 While the "curiosity factor" is mentioned in the Somers Report, supra note 147 at 22, 
it appears to be taken into account only for the first year. This commentary suggests 
that it be taken into account for at least three years. 
Exhibit 9 of the Somers Report indicates that in the years 1970-1976 police and fire 
bargaining units increased from 163 to 380. Many units are negotiating agreements for 
the first time. Both sides may be initially hesitant to compromise, for political and other 
reasons. Each time municipal officials are elected, a new bargaining relationship must be 
established with the union. 
Although third party settlement, and the threat thereof, should ideally induce parties 
to reach voluntary agreement, such settlement does have political advantages in the 
public sector. It is possible that arbitration decisions will confirm decisions which the 
parties have made, but which they prefer to have issued as arbitration awards rather 
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binding arbitration, or its extension to other public employee groups, 
should therefore be withheld until there has been more experience 
under the 1973 statute.208 
The binding arbitration procedure, to be successful, must prevent il-
legal strikes in the area of public safety.209 It must be acceptable to the 
parties involved in more than just a constitutional sense210 and must 
not appear to favor one side or the other.211 
Additionally, it is of critical importance that the procedure not be 
viewed as a complete substitute for meaningful collective bargaining. 
The risks inherent in "total package" final offer arbitration should en-
courage the parties to settle prior to arbitration. The mediation power 
given to the factfinder as well as the arbitration panel provides flexi-
bility and encourages two-party settlement up to the time a third party 
award is issued.212 Such two-party agreement is far superior to one 
than their own agreements, for political reasons. Or, when militants on either side press 
for arbitration, the process becomes "a quasi-strike weapon in the sense that it is the ul-
timate impasse step which evidences unrelenting aggressiveness as well as belief in the 
justice of one's own cause." Lowenberg, What the Private Sector Can Learn from the Public 
Sector in Interest Arbitration: The Pennsylvania Experience, ARBITRATION-1974 PROCEEDING 
OF THE TWENTY·SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 71 
(1974). 
208 This position was also taken by the Interim Report of the Governor's Task Force on 
Chapter 150E and Impasse Procedures, Pub. No. 9102-14-35-8-76-CR. 
209 Somers Report supra note 147 at 13. The finality produced by binding arbitration, 
by reducing the frustration existing when police and fire personnel had nothing beyond 
factfinding to compel public employer collective bargaining, should result in no strikes 
whatsoever if the statute is working effectively. Any incidence of work stoppage would 
be cause for serious question as to the new law's effectiveness. 
210ld. at 13. The Town of Arlington decision was rendered after the Somers Report data 
had been collected, and should significantly reduce non-compliance cases grounded on 
constitutional challenges. The terms of the new law provide that the arbitration panel's 
award may be enforced in the superior court in equity if supported by material and 
substantive evidence on the whole record. See C.L. c. 150E, § 4. Initial cases seeking ju-
dicial review of arbitration panel awards are not indicative of any broad non-compliance 
movement. 
211 The Somers Report, supra note 147 finds that "final offer" outcomes under the stat-
ute appear to favor unions at a two-to-one ratio, and concludes that unions have a dis-
tinct advantage under the procedure. Id. at 14; Appendix, Exhibit 3. Additionally, the 
report's findings indicated that the use of arbitration leads to excessive wage increase, id. 
at 16, Table 1; that the threat of arbitration has had an upward influence on negotiated 
police and fire wage settlements, id. at 18, Appendix at Exhibit 7; and that the existence 
of arbitration has a spillover effect which directly benefits non-public safety groups. Id. 
at 19, Table 1 at 16. From this the report concIdes that the economic impact of arbi-
tration has been "unduly excessive," id. at 19, and characterizes the arbitration process 
as "seriously flawed," id. 
There are inherent problems with properly defining what is "unduly excessive," de-
spite one's persuasion. The new law gave more meaningful bargaining rights to public 
safety personnel. Subsequent awards might be characterized as "catching up." It should 
come as no suprise that third party settlement produces an award slightly higher than 
that previously reached by the public employer after non-binding factfinder's reports. 
The ability to compel arbitration can be viewed as a bargaining chip which compels 
more realistic mutual negotiations that will produce a contract short of arbitration. 
212 Rehmus, Is a "Final Offer" Ever Final? Lessons from Interest Arbitration in the Public 
Sector, ARBITRATION.1974 PROCEEDING OF THE TWENTy·SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING. NA· 
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imposed by a third party no matter at what point in the negotiation it 
occurs.213 
The key test in judging the law's ability to generate meaningful col-
lective bargaining will be whether or not government employers and 
public safety employee groups, having gained additional expertise in 
bargaining under the new law, insist on returning to arbitration in 
successive years on a regular basis. Such a finding, beyond the initial 
experimentation, would indicate that the law was not having a positive 
effect on the collective bargaining it was meant to foster, and that the 
parties, having once submitted an impasse to third party settlement, 
were in danger of abdicating their responsibility to bargain in good 
faith. 
Upon balancing the needs of public police and fire personnel for 
meaningful bargaining rights, of the community for uninterrupted 
police and fire service, and of municipal and town governments for 
creating fiscally responsible budgets, it appears that only compulsory 
arbitration preserves essential bargaining rights while protecting the 
public from harmful economic coercion. However, arbitration in the 
public sector will not succeed unless neutral arbitrators, with the abil-
ity to determine what cities and towns can practically afford to pay in 
wage settlements, are capable of making decisions that are timely in 
relation to the funding of the municipal budget, and that do not in-
ordinately distort the political process surrounding municipal 
budgetmaking. Arbitration will also fail insofar as it encourages con-
stant reliance thereon rather than responsible two-party negotiation. 
Because additional time is needed to measure the effect of the new 
law beyond initial experimentation, the extension of chapter 150E for 
three more years, without major modifications, is warranted.214 
PATRICK T. JONES 
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS at 78. For alternative techniques along these lines, see 
Kagel, Combining Mediation andArbitration, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Special Section: Explor-
ing Alternatives to the Strike) (September, 1973). Under Kagel's med-arb, the 
mediator (perhaps more familiar with the parties' positions and concerns on each issue 
than the arbitrator), becomes the arbitrator of the unresolved issues. The mediation 
process is conducted in a more informal way than the arbitral process, and may p~o­
mote better communication between the parties. Such a procedure also places more In-
centive on the parties to come to their own agreements. 
213Id. 
214 Following the close of the Survey year, the binding arbitration provisions of G.L. c. 
150E, §4, were extended by the General Court for an additional two year period. 
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